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Gallardo, Ouattara, Randhawa and Steel investigate the microfinance regulatory regimes in Benin, Ghana 
and Tanzania, with a view to identifying key issues and lessons on how the overall regulatory framework 
affects integration of microfinance institutions into the financial system.  The authors find that 
recognizing different tiers of both regulated and unregulated institutions in a financial structure facilitates 
financial deepening and outreach to otherwise underserved groups in urban and rural areas.  That 
environment promotes sustainable microfinance  under shared performance standards, and encourages 
regulatory authorities to develop appropriate prudential regulations and staff capacity.  Case studies of the 
three countries raised important issues on promoting microfinance development vis-à-vis regulating them.  
Laws to regulate activities other than intermediation of public deposits into loans can result in 
disproportionately restrictive and unmanageable standards, even as dynamic microfinance sectors have 
emerged without conducive regulatory regimes. The three countries’ regulatory experiences are used to 
highlight the importance of differentiating when prudential supervision is warranted and when regulatory 
oversight suffices, and to identify the agencies to carry out regulation.  The paper addresses an important 
issue that has received scant attention, measuring and paying for the costs of regulating microfinance, and 
the need to build technical capacity of supervisory and regulatory staff.   
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BCEAO  Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African 
States) 
CAR  Capital adequacy ratio 
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EDPYME  entidad de desarrollo para la pequeña y micro empresa (development finance 
institutions for small and micro-enterprises) 
FECECAM  Fédération des Caisses d’Épargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuel (Benin) 
(Federation of Savings and Credit Cooperatives) 
FENACREP  Fédération Nationale des Caisses Rurales d’Epargne et de Crédit (National 
Federation of Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives) 
FIE  Fomento a Iniciativas Económicas (Bolivia) 
FINCA  Foundation for International Community Assistance (Tanzania) 
GDP   gross domestic product 
MCR  minimum capital requirements 
MFI  microfinance institution 
NBFI  non-bank financial institution 
NGO  Nongovernmental organization 
PADME  Programme d’Appui au Développment des MicroEntreprises (Benin) 
(Microenterprise Development Support Program) 
PAPME  Programme d’Appui aux Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (Benin) (Small and 
Medium Enterprise Support Program) 
PARMEC   Projet d’Appui à la Réglementation sur les Mutuelles d’Épargne et de Crédit 
(Benin) Project to Assist the Regulation of Savings and Credit Cooperatives) 
PRIDE  Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprises (Tanzania) 
RCB  rural and community bank (Ghana) 
S&L  savings and loan company (Ghana) 
SACCO  savings and credit cooperative organization 
UMOA  Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West African Monetary Union)  vi 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This review identifies key issues and lessons about how the overall regulatory framework affects the 
ability of microfinance institutions (MFIs) to become more market-oriented and  integrated with the 
financial system. Many countries in Africa are looking to sustainable microfinance to expand access to 
financial services as a linchpin of the strategy to reduce poverty.  Donors are demanding better 
performance in terms of financial sustainability and outreach of microfinance institutions (MFIs), to better 
leverage their support.  As MFIs grow and begin mobilizing commercial resources beyond grants, central 
banks are increasingly being called upon to regulate and supervise MFIs under existing or new legal and 
regulatory frameworks. 
Recognizing that legal and regulatory structures are key to modernization, financial sector reforms in 
many African countries over the past decade have sought to allow banks to operate on a commercial 
basis, free from official intervention but within the norms of prudential supervision.  Reform measures 
have included liberalizing interest rates, eliminating administrative credit allocation, strengthening the 
role of central banks in regulating and supervising f inancial institutions, restructuring state-owned 
financial institutions, and allowing entry of local and private banks into the market.   
In most cases, however, progress in the formal financial system has not been accompanied by expanded 
access to financi al services for large segments of the population.  Basic deposit, payments and credit 
services have remained costly and beyond reach because of the poor state of roads and communications 
and because of complex conditions and difficult collateral requirements of commercial bank finance. 
Microfinance methodologies offer the potential both to make financial services available to the poor and 
to become commercially viable.  But in the underdeveloped financial markets typical of African 
countries, most central banks lack both a clear understanding of microfinance methodologies and the staff 
to supervise them. Legislation intended to promote microfinance may impose untenable supervisory 
burdens, while an excessively restrictive approach may constrict innovation and expansion.  This paper 
summarizes the findings of three country studies undertaken by the World Bank on microfinance 
regulation in Benin, Ghana and Tanzania to better inform its advice and project design  regarding the 
appropriate balance among the objectives of promotion, performance, and prudential supervision.    
Tiered Structure of Microfinance Institutions and Corresponding Regulation 
The objective of integrating microfinance into the financial sector does not mean that all MFIs need to be 
regulated. The aim is to build strong regulated and unregulated institutions of all types to provide services 
on a sustainable basis under shared performance standards and to encourage the regulatory authorities to 
develop appropriate prudential regulations and staff capacity. This involves defining different tiers of 
financial institutions with different degrees of regulatory requirements. Lower tiers of institutions serving 
the lower end of the market can enable non-bank microlenders to seek greater formalization without 
actual licensing from a central bank.  
As the industry grows, adding a licensing tier that permits MFIs to mobilize savings and other 
commercial sources of funds legally can encourage capacity building and innovation aimed at self-
sufficiency and greater outreach.  Another approach is to open a special window for microlending as a 
product that enables commercial banks, as well as alternative specialized institutions, to benefit from 
different cost and regulatory structures. Licensing of rural and community banks can also facilitate the 
emergence of new types of MFIs serving specific markets. On the other hand, premature creation of 
special tiers with easy entry may result in weak institutions and risks overwhelming inadequate 
supervisory resources. Hence licensing of MFIs should be designed to balance promotional and prudential 
objectives.  vii 
 
Table 1.  Tiered Structure and Regulatory Triggers, by Type of MFI 
Type of MFI  
Activities that trigger 
regulation  Forms of external regulation 
Recommended 
regulatory authority 
Informal savings and credit groups 
funded by member fees and savings 
None  None required  None required 
Category A: Nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) funded by donor funds 
   
Category A1: Funding only from 
donor grants  
None, if total loans do not 
exceed donated funds, grants 
and accumulated surplus 
Registration as a nonprofit 
society, association or trust 
A registrar of societies, 
self-regulatory body if any  
Category A2: Funding from donor 
grants and from commercial 
borrowings or securities issues 
Generating liabilities through 
borrowings to fund microloan 
portfolio and operations 
Registration as a corporate legal 
entity, authorization by a 
banking authority or securities 
commission 
A registrar of companies, 
banking authority, 
securities agency 
Category B: Financial cooperatives 
and credit unions funded by 
members’ money and savings 
Accepting deposits from and 
making loans to members 
Registration as a financial 
cooperative 
A registrar of cooperatives 
or banking authority 
Category C: Special-licensed banks 
and MFIs funded by the public’s 
money (deposits, investor’s capital, 
commercial borrowings) 
Accepting wholesale and 
retail public deposits for 
intermediation into loans and 
investments 
Registration as a corporate legal 
entity, licensing as a finance 
company or bank (with full 
prudential requirements) 
A registrar of companies, 
banking authority 
Note: This regulatory classification of MFIs was originally proposed by van Greuning, Gallardo, and Randhawa in 1999, and 
modified by Randhawa in 2003. Except for informal groups, MFIs are classified into four categories based on the structure of 
their liabilities, i.e.  sources of  funding. Cooperatives in category B have a long but inefficient history of regulation. If their 
deposit-taking is small in scale and  limited to their members, they should be given low regulatory priority. Category C should not 
include MFIs that require mandatory savings to secure loans as long as most customers are net borrowers most of the time. 
Formal banks with a microfinance department are not included above as they are subject to prudential supervision, even if it is 
usually not adapted to the specific features of this segment of business. 
 
Regulation of microfinance activities and MFIs may take three main forms: (i) simple registration as a 
legal entity; (ii) non-prudential regulations that provide standards of business operations and oversight, 
such as operating and financial reports to be submitted, to protect the interests of clients or members;  and 
(iii) full prudential supervision.  Prudential supervision involves verification by regulatory authorities of 
compliance by institutions with mandatory standards such as minimum capital levels and adequacy, 
liquidity management ratios and asset quality standards, as measures for financial soundness.  Prudential 
supervision of deposit-taking category C institutions is aimed at protecting public savings that are being 
mobilized and lent out (“intermediated”), which puts them at risk of being lost if loans are not repaid.   
Member-based MFIs in category B differ from local, informal savings and credit groups in that they are 
registered with a national authority and may be part of a national network.  They are often assumed to be 
self-regulating through their governance structure.  However, this assumption may be untenable as 
institutions become larger. To improve information and governance, non-prudential regulation may be 
appropriate, e.g., requirements to provide audited financial statements. Small cooperative groups are 
beyond the reach and necessity of regulation, but a transition to external supervision may be appropriate 
at some stage of growth for larger savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and credit unions (CUs).  
Defining this transition threshold in the abstract is difficult, and needs to be related to the size at which a 
SACCO’s or CU’s assets approximate those of licensed financial intermediaries or pose risks that could 
destabilize the financial system.  Regulation of MFIs in category A2 is triggered by their use of 
concessionary or commercial loans or the issue of securities, which signals the need to protect investors. 
Prudential supervision of Category A1 MFIs that lend out of grant or donated funds is not needed to 
protect depositors or investors.  viii 
Country Highlights 
A good legal and regulatory framework for microfinance involves adapting basic principles to the 
conditions prevailing in a given country in terms of the range of institutions engaged in microfinance, the 
thresholds already established in the financial system, and the technical capacity of the regulatory 
authorities.  Although they represent comparable levels of economic development, low but growing 
income per capita, and shallow financial sectors, Benin, Ghana and Tanzania vary in the nature of their 
MFIs and in their experiences with microfinance regulation.  Benin’s regulatory experience is informed 
by the objective of controlling the provision of microfinance in line with regional control over banking 
and financial institutions and activities.  Ghana’s regulatory framework has been evolving to include a 
diversity of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), some serving rural and low-income sectors, under a 
centralized prudential regulation umbrella.  Supported by international donor agencies, T anzania is 
shaping its regulatory framework to promote development of commercial microfinance as a major tool in 
achieving poverty alleviation and related economic growth goals.  
Benin  
Despite its relatively small size, Benin has a diverse array of MFIs and the largest number in the West 
Africa Monetary Union (UMOA), which controls banking and finance in  eight member states through a 
unified central bank.  These consist of licensed credit unions or mutuelles (the only officially-recognized 
licensing format), registered credit-only MFIs, several donor projects with microcredit components, and a 
variety of informal groups and associations. The microfinance sector has an estimated outreach of 
700,000 clients, with some US$ 33 million in loans outstanding and US$ 40 million in savings deposits.   
UMOA’s law for microfinance was intended both to promote and to bring order into the sector.  The law 
defined SACCOs (or mutuelles) as the only officially sanctioned format, but allowed NGOs, donor 
projects and informal organizations to engage in microfinance if registered with the Ministry of Finance, 
which was tasked with supervising the entire sector. 
Ghana  
Ghana’s formal and semiformal MFIs reach some 1.5 million clients, members and depositors, of which 
less than a third have loans. They include 115 licensed rural and community banks (RCBs) with over a 
million depositors and 150,000 borrowers; 9 licensed savings and loan companies (S&Ls) with more than 
160,000 depositors and 10,000 borrowers; and 253 credit unions with over 120,000 members. Some 
60,000 borrowing clients are served by 50 microcredit non-government organizations (NGOs), but most 
of these entities, as well as even smaller community-based organizations, have fewer than 1,000 clients 
each.  
Ghana’s multi-tiered regulatory structure evolved through early efforts in the 1970s to extend the outreach 
of the formal financial system and service the cocoa sector by permitting locally-owned unit Rural Banks, 
and subsequently through the 1993 Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, which was intended to diversify 
the financial sector. Credit unions were included in the latter, but central bank supervision proved 
unworkable, and a new Credit Union law was prepared that envisages dual responsibility of the central 
bank  and the Department of Cooperatives, which registers credit unions.  The Ghana Micro Finance 
Institutions Network (GHAMFIN) cuts across formal, semiformal, and informal institutions, and is being 
restructured as an umbrella body governed by representatives  of their respective associations. 
GHAMFIN’s objectives include institutional performance monitoring and benchmarking to develop 
industry standards for unregulated, as well as regulated institutions. 
Tanzania  
Tanzania’s tiered financial sector is relatively new and shallow, consisting of 20 licensed banks and 11 
non-bank financial institutions, and a 17.5 percent level of monetization.  Licensed banks dominate the 
system, but bank deposits amount to only 14 percent of GDP, among the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Three categories of registered financial institutions provide financial services to households, micro and 
small enterprises: (i) licensed commercial, regional and rural banks, (ii) SACCOs, and (iii) NGO-based  
MFIs.  In contrast to Benin and Ghana, the Tanzania Postal Savings bank and several commercial banks  ix 
(National Microfinance Bank, CRDB Bank and Akiba Commercial Bank) are the leading providers of 
microfinance services, with outreach that exceeds the combined outreach of SACCOs and MFIs. The 650 
active urban and rural SACCOs have an estimated membership base between 130,000 to 160,000, only a 
fifth of them borrowers.  The 60 NGO MFIs are dominated by two large NGOs – PRIDE and FINCA – 
which have three-quarters of the market, estimated at 100,000 client-members.  The NGO-MFIs serve a 
predominantly urban clientele, and  competition appears to be growing as lenders strive to keep their base 
of good-paying clients.  International donor agencies comprise a significant and influential stakeholder 
group in Tanzanian microfinance, providing technical assistance as well as funding.  
Establishment of a National Microfinance Bank to retain the rural branch network of the privatized 
National Bank of Commerce helped motivate Tanzania’s establishment of an explicitly multi-tiered 
regulatory framework, both to facilitate engagement of formal financial institutions in microfinance and 
to ease the graduation of unregulated microfinance institutions to formal status. The regulatory 
requirements are still emerging, and so far there has been little entry or conversion to licensed categories 
such as regional and rural community banks.   
Main Findings 
The worldwide success that MFIs and microfinance programs have achieved in making financial services 
accessible to the poor and microenterprises has spawned initiatives to expand them.  Regulatory responses 
have ranged from deliberate efforts to promote microfinance development by establishing special 
regulatory niches to control of heretofore unregulated MFI activities. An i ntermediate approach is to 
integrate commercial microfinance into the formal financial sector by adjusting existing regulatory 
structures. 
Commercial microfinance on a well-organized and nationally coordinated basis is a relatively new 
development in the three case study countries, and umbrella organizations for microfinance have been 
organized only in the last few years.  Formally established and regulated microfinance providers are still 
relatively few, and a significant portion of microcredit services are provided by the numerous informal 
and semi-formal entities which are mostly not regulated and often not registered. The case studies of 
efforts to promote microfinance, improve performance of MFIs in terms of outreach and sustainability, 
and regulate them raised a number of issues pertinent to microfinance regulation, as discussed below. 
Should microfinance regulation be used as a tool to promote growth of the industry? 
Incorporating microfinance into the formal financial system in order to expand access to financial services 
offers an attractive alternative to using microcredit as an instrument for socially-motivated poverty 
alleviation projects in that it emphasis the financial sustainability necessary to continue serving the poor 
over time without subsidy dependence.  However, regulatory frameworks designed for objectives other 
than regulating the taking of deposits from the public and intermediating them into loans often result in 
standards that are disproportionately restrictive and unmanageable.  A major task is to differentiate the 
regulatory oversight needed to promote fair and transparent business practices from the prudential 
supervision required to ensure safety of public deposits and the security of the financial system, such that 
public benefits are likely to justify the costs involved.  Licensing and supervision of MFIs as a 
promotional tool works best when it is narrowly targeted on enabling commercially-oriented MFIs to take 
deposits and attract investors in order to fund their growth. 
Impact of regulatory framework on microfinance development 
Microfinance legislation has proven least effective in developing well-regulated microfinance systems 
when MFIs brought under new regulatory regimes fall below the triggers indicated in Table 1 and when 
the regulatory burdens surpass the capacity of the supervisory authorities. This is illustrated by the case of 
Benin. The task of supervising over 1100 retail MFIs – even just the 220 that are registered – has greatly 
exceeded the capabilities of the Ministry, despite its access to technical assistance. The regional central 
bank is now planning to take over supervision of the 40 largest MFIs.  The mandatory licensing of MFIs 
has in effect officially sanctioned their operations, despite the government authorities’ inability  to assure 
the public that they are well-managed and adequately capitalized.     x 
Technical capacity to supervise and be supervised: who bears the costs? 
The benefits from regulating microfinance may be limited when commercial banking standards are 
applied to MFIs without adequate consideration of microfinance methodologies.  For supervision to be 
effective, the data requirements and the indicators used must be adapted to the operations of MFIs, and 
they in turn must adapt their information systems to central bank reporting requirements. Given the short-
term nature of MFI loan portfolios, more rigorous standards in certain areas, such as portfolio quality and 
provisioning, together with more frequent monitoring, may be warranted.  This raises a further issue that 
has received scant attention:  measuring and paying for the costs of supervision.  The costs of supervising 
MFIs are likely to be greater than those for commercial banks, especially when the more numerous and 
small MFIs outnumber the banks.  Moreover, supervision fees are usually set as a percentage of the value 
of assets examined, and MFIs’ asset bases are much smaller than those of banks. Donors have generally 
supported central banks in developing regulatory guidelines and standards for MFIs, as in Ghana and 
Tanzania. However, more resources will be needed to address deficiencies in technical capacity  – not 
only for the supervisory agencies, but also for the MFIs subject to regulation. 
Locus of regulatory policy: who should regulate? 
An  important issue is the extent to which regulatory authority should be centralized, delegated, or 
decentralized. Like many other countries in Africa, the microfinance regulatory frameworks of Benin, 
Ghana and Tanzania have come into being under circumstances of fragmented authority. A central bank 
authority is responsible for prudential supervision of licensed banks and financial institutions, a 
cooperatives authority is responsible for member-based SACCOs (usually focused on registration and 
cooperative principles rather than financial performance), and NGO MFIs are registered with non-
financial government agencies.  Delegation of supervisory functions by the regional central bank of 
UMOA to Ministries of Finance has proven ineffective.  In deciding how best to implement regulatory 
responsibilities, two distinctions are important:  regulatory policy should have a single locus, while 
application of regulatory  functions can be delegated to different regulatory units with specialized 
responsibilities; and the criteria and authorities for prudential supervision should differ from those for 
non-prudential regulatory oversight, along the lines indicated in Table 1. 
Cooperative financial institutions   
Financial cooperatives offer important potential for decentralizing financial services, particularly in rural 
areas that banks and commercial MFIs may find too costly to reach.  But it has proven difficult both to 
promote their growth as sustainable financial intermediaries and to integrate them into formal financial 
regulatory systems. While Benin’s microfinance law prioritizes financial cooperatives, the supervisory 
burden has proven overwhelming, aggravated by responsibilities for also supervising non-deposit-taking 
MFIs. Financial policy-makers in Ghana and Tanzania have begun to recognize the need to incorporate 
financial cooperatives into the regulatory framework, although they are effectively excluded in the 
practical application of financial regulations.  Ghana’s proposed approach of recognizing dual 
responsibilities of central bank and cooperatives authorities for CUs, with some delegation of front-line 
supervision to the apex body, appears promising and bears watching.  
Key Lessons Learned 
The experience in the three countries does not support the proposition that establishing new 
regulatory categories will necessarily promote commercialization of microfinance or the creation of 
financially sustainable MFIs where few or none exist.  Experiences in other countries such as Uganda 
and Kenya show that a variety of viable and sustainable MFIs can emerge and develop without a 
microfinance-specific regulatory framework, while microfinance continues to flourish in Benin despite a 
restrictive legal and regulatory framework.  When there is a critical mass of viable microfinance 
providers, new legislation to amend the regulatory framework is likely to be more productive in 
facilitating the transformation of high-performing non-bank MFIs to licensed status in a specially adapted 
niche – which is the approach that Uganda and Kenya are now taking.    xi 
The capacities of authorities to implement their regulatory obligations and of MFIs to comply are a 
critical constraint on the effectiveness of new legislation in promoting and regulating microfinance. 
Setting up new licensing categories for rural banks and savings and loan companies in Ghana did 
stimulate entry of new types of MFIs that helped broaden and deepen access to financial services. 
Nevertheless, neither the institutions nor the regulatory authorities had adequate technical capacity to 
ensure compliance with regulatory standards, leading subsequently to more demanding requirements as a 
barrier to new entry.  New legislation in Benin and Tanzania brought existing non-bank MFIs under 
licensing and supervisory requirements, but the goal of forcing improvements in their financial 
performance is not likely to be realized, because the coverage of institutions greatly exceeds the 
capabilities of the designated supervisory authorities and the non-bank MFIs targeted for regulation are 
organizationally and financially weak.  
The development of a new regulatory framework for microfinance should be accompanied by 
complementary modifications of other business laws and regulations.  This is true especially in the 
areas of taxation, contract enforcement, collateral registration and enforcement, securities regulations and 
consumer protection.  These laws and administrative rules also need to be adapted to microfinance 
methodologies, where loan transactions and the legal status of borrowers differ markedly from those in 
conventional commercial banking and finance. 
The creation of microfinance legal and regulatory structures should be accompanied by substantial 
up-front investment in raising the awareness of policymakers, consulting with stakeholders, 
improving systems and staff capabilities in MFIs to be regulated, and staffing up and training the 
supervisory authorities.  As the microfinance sector develops in response to demand from underserved 
segments, the overall regulatory framework for the financial sector is likely to be subjected to pressures 
for adjustments and changes, as is the case in all three countries studied.  Hasty passage of new laws or 
introduction of government programs without adequate consultation or awareness of good (and bad) 
practices risks putting in place systems with a short-term focus that may undermine longer-term 
development objectives. Opening up formal licensing to MFIs too rapidly may overwhelm the capacity of 
the supervisory authorities.   
An unbalanced approach results in inadequate attention to supervisory capacity and costs in the 
design of the regulatory framework.  The experience of MFIs in other countries demonstrates that 
mobilizing savings and managing them safely and profitably entails a more complex set of skills, systems 
and resources than accessing and intermediating wholesale commercial funds.  Using the regulatory 
framework to push microfinance development is likely to result in overlooking other less costly and less 
technically demanding approaches to commercializing microfinance, e.g., regulations that enable MFIs to 
access commercial funds from licensed banks and forge strategic alliances with the formal financial 
sector. 
Regulators and supervisors should distinguish between deposit-taking MFIs, whose  financial 
soundness they verify through prudential supervision, and those MFIs that may be registered and 
subjected to non-prudential regulations  but do not pose financial system risks for which  the 
financial authorities bear responsibility. Credit-only MFIs that do not mobilize public deposits should 
be excluded from prudential supervision, to conserve scarce supervisory resources and because the 
public’s savings are not at stake. In such cases donors, banks, and other funders can be expected to 
exercise adequate oversight. Small member-based savings and credit associations are normally excluded 
from direct prudential supervision by the regulatory authorities, although regulatory oversight by an 
independent body or industry association is desirable for data-gathering and performance-reporting in 
meeting established standards.  
   1 
I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
1.  During the last 15 years microfinance has emerged as an important tool for poverty alleviation. The term 
“microfinance” refers to methodologies used to make extremely small financial transactions at reasonable 
levels of cost and affordability. Experience has demonstrated the potential of microfinance for expanding 
and deepening the access of the poor and low-income households and of their micro-enterprises to 
financial services. In most developing countries licensed banks typically serve no more than 5 to 20 
percent of the population. The emergence of sustainable microfinance institutions (MFIs) has enhanced 
the development of the financial sector in many countries that have undertaken macroeconomic and 
financial reforms by extending the reach of the financial system to new market niches and contributing to 
financial deepening. However, MFIs need to change and develop as the scope of their operations grows 
beyond the provision of credit to include savings, insurance and other financial services, and as the scale 
of their operations expands to reach larger numbers of clients.  
2.  Global experience shows that the widely accepted objectives of financial self-sufficiency of MFIs along 
with significant and growing outreach is best achieved through a financial systems approach. In contrast 
to programs oriented toward income transfers to targeted beneficiaries, the financial systems approach 
emphasizes microfinance on a commercial basis as an integral part of financial sector development, 
whereby a wider range of institutional providers is enabled to provide a greater variety of financial 
instruments and services to more diverse clients, especially those at lower income levels and in rural areas. 
Widening client outreach and expanding product offerings requires funding resources beyond the finite 
limits of grants and donor funds, including borrowing from formal financial institutions, raising equity 
from institutional and individual investors, and accepting deposits from the public.  
3.  A country’s legal and regulatory framework can have an important impact on licensed financial 
intermediaries moving down-market and on nonlicensed MFIs that want to access commercial sources of 
funds or to transform into licensed, specialized institutions. With the rapid growth of MFIs in African 
countries in the last 10 to 15 years, and with microfinance increasingly advocated by policy advisers as an 
instrument for poverty reduction, governments and central banks have been introducing laws and 
regulations to govern microfinance, whether as part of an effort to promote development of the sector, to 
protect the public, to achieve social objectives, or to impose greater control.  
OBJECTIVES  
4.  The literature that documents the global experience in microfinance development identifies the legal and 
regulatory framework as one factor that influences the emergence of different types of institutional 
providers of varying kinds of microfinance services and their evolution into commercially-oriented, 
sustainable MFIs. Approaches to microfinance regulation both in African countries and worldwide have 
varied widely, from early introduction of restrictive legislation to gradual adaptation of regulation to the 
emerging variety of MFIs. The microfinance sector itself has evolved along a variety of patterns and 
growth paths in different countries and regions. This review is intended to draw lessons based on varying 
experiences as to the advantages and disadvantages of different strategies for regulating microfinance to 
provide guidance on how the regulatory framework can best promote the expansion of microfinance as 
part of the financial system’s development and outreach.  
5.  The study focuses on microfinance experience in three African countries—Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania—
to investigate a number of key issues pertaining to microfinance regulation, including restrictiveness, 
integration, policy sequencing, capacity building, and approaches to and costs of r egulation and 
supervision. The study aims to present a comparative assessment of the influence of the legal and 
regulatory framework on the microfinance sector and the benefits and risks of different approaches, 
principally in the three countries, but also in other countries.  
6.  The study identifies notable achievements as well as remaining challenges the three countries face in 
integrating the microfinance sector into the formal financial sector. The study uses the practical lessons 
drawn from their experiences with the relationship between microfinance development and different policy   2 
and legal environments as a basis for guidance to policymakers, regulators, and donor agencies on how the 
structure of legal and regulatory systems may affect, and in turn be i nfluenced by, the evolution of 
microfinance in different country contexts. The findings and recommendations are also intended to 
provide technical guidance so that the World Bank’s advice and lending operations in the Africa Region 
can become more consistent, especially as issues of licensing and regulating microfinance institutions and 
activities are an increasing concern of the Bank’s client countries.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  A TIERED STRUCTURE OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIOINS IN FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS APPROACH 
7.  Global experience underscores the importance of MFIs gaining access to funds from commercial sources 
to expand outreach to clients.  This is generally possible only when the policy and regulatory environment 
permits such access and when MFIs have the requisite legal status and financial standing. A financial 
institution’s ability to leverage capital funds to support a greater number of microloans is directly related 
to its ability to access funds from commercial sources.  Funds from commercial sources consist of 
voluntary retail deposits, wholesale and institutional deposits, and borrowings from commercial sources 
such as banks and other formal financial institutions, all mobilized at market rates of interest. MFIs 
organized as NGOs generally have the least ability to leverage capital and the lowest percentage of 
external commercial funds relative to average total loans, because the legal format does not allow NGOs to 
mobilize voluntary deposits and restricts their ability to access commercial funds in the form of wholesale 
and institutional deposits or borrowings from commercial banks. 
8.  The objective of integrating microfinance into the financial sector does not mean that all MFIs need to be 
regulated. The aim is to build strong regulated and unregulated institutions of all types to provide services 
on a sustainable basis under shared performance standards and to encourage the regulatory authorities to 
develop appropriate prudential regulations and staff capacity. This involves defining different tiers of 
financial institutions with different degrees of regulatory requirements, as illustrated in table 1 below. 
Lower tiers of institutions serving the lower end of the market can enable non-bank microlenders to seek 
greater formalization without actual licensing from a central bank.  
9.  As the industry grows, adding a licensing tier that permits MFIs to mobilize savings and other commercial 
sources of funds legally can encourage capacity building and innovation aimed at self-sufficiency and 
greater outreach.  Another approach is to open a special window for microlending as a product that enables 
commercial banks, as well as alternative specialized institutions, to benefit from different cost and 
regulatory structures. Licensing of rural and community banks can also facilitate the emergence of new 
types of MFIs serving specific markets. On the other hand, premature creation of special tiers with easy 
entry may result in weak institutions and risks overwhelming inadequate supervisory resources. Hence 
licensing of MFIs should be designed to balance promotional and prudential objectives.   3 
Table 1.  Tiered Structure and Regulatory Triggers, by Type of MFI 
Type of MFI  
Activities that trigger 
regulation  Forms of external regulation 
Recommended regulatory 
authority 
Informal savings and credit groups 
funded by member fees and savings 
None  None required  None required 
Category A: Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) funded by 
donor funds 
   
Category A1: Funding only from 
donor grants  
None, if total loans do not 
exceed donated funds, 
grants and accumulated 
surplus 
Registration as a nonprofit society, 
association or trust 
A registrar of societies, 
self-regulatory body if any  
Category A2: Funding from donor 
grants and from commercial 
borrowings or securities issues 
Generating liabilities 
through borrowings to fund 
microloan portfolio and 
operations 
Registration as a corporate legal 
entity, authorization by a banking 
authority or securities commission 
A registrar of companies, 
banking authority, 
securities agency 
Category B: Financial cooperatives 
and credit unions funded by 
members’ money and savings 
Accepting deposits from 
and making loans to 
members 
Registration as a financial 
cooperative 
A registrar of cooperatives 
or banking authority 
Category C: Special-licensed banks 
and MFIs funded by the public’s 
money (deposits, investor’s capital, 
commercial borrowings) 
Accepting wholesale and 
retail public deposits for 
intermediation into loans 
and investments 
Registration as a corporate legal 
entity, licensing as a finance 
company or bank (with full prudential 
requirements) 
A registrar of companies, 
banking authority 
Note: This regulatory classification of MFIs was originally proposed by van Greuning, Gallardo, and Randhawa in 1999, and modified by 
Randhawa in 2003. Except for informal groups, MFIs are classified into four categories based on the structure of their liabilities, i.e.  
sources of  funding. Cooperatives in category B have a long but inefficient history of regulation. If their deposit-taking is small in scale and  
limited to their members, they should be given low regulatory priority. Category C should not include MFIs that require mandatory savings 
to secure loans as long as most customers are net borrowers most of the time. Formal banks with a microfinance department are not 
included above as they are subject to prudential supervision, even if it is usually not adapted to the specific features of this segment of 
business. 
10.  Regulation of microfinance activities and MFIs may take three main forms: (i) simple registration as a 
legal entity; (ii) non-prudential regulations that provide standards of business operations and oversight, 
such as operating and financial reports to be submitted, to protect the interests of clients or members;  and 
(iii) full prudential supervision.  Prudential supervision involves verification by regulatory authorities of 
compliance by institutions with mandatory standards such as minimum capital levels and adequacy, 
liquidity management ratios and asset quality standards, as measures for financial soundness.  Prudential 
supervision of deposit-taking category C institutions is aimed at protecting public savings that are being 
mobilized and lent out (i.e., intermediated), which puts them at risk of being lost if loans are not repaid.   
11.  Member-based MFIs in category B differ from local, informal savings and credit groups in that they are 
registered with a national authority and may be part of a national network.  They are often assumed to be 
self-regulating through their governance structure.  However, this assumption may be untenable as 
institutions become larger. To improve information and governance, non-prudential regulation may be 
appropriate, e.g., requirements to provide audited financial statements. Small cooperative groups are 
beyond the reach and necessity of regulation, but a transition to external supervision may be appropriate at 
some stage of growth for larger SACCOs and credit unions (CUs).  Defining this transition threshold in 
the abstract is difficult, and needs to be related to the size at which a SACCO’s or CU’s assets 
approximate those of licensed financial intermediaries or pose risks that could destabilize the financial 
system.  Regulation of MFIs in category A2 is triggered by their use of concessionary or commercial loans 
or the issue of securities, which signals the need to protect investors. Prudential supervision of Category 
A1 MFIs that lend out of grant or donated funds is not needed to protect depositors or investors. 
12.  Tiered structures of banks and NBFIs, including MFIs, enhance the operating and market linkages among 
regulated and unregulated intermediaries in the continuum of microfinance institutions. Different legal 
structures for microfinance that regulate different tiers include community-based groups, credit-only NGO 
MFIs, cooperative financial institutions (CFIs), regulated specialized MFIs, NBFIs, and commercial banks 
with microfinance products. Policies and regulations that recognize the important roles of these different 
structures can strengthen the process of commercializing and scaling up MFIs that provide low-income   4 
households and micro-enterprises with access to a wide array of sustainable financial services. CFIs — 
whether informal or registered (in different countries), such as SACCOs, credit unions, mutuels, or village 
banks  — are of particular interest, both because they offer the potential for offering sustainable, 
community-based financial services to lower-income rural populations, and because their traditional 
treatment as cooperatives in most African countries poses special problems for inculcating commercial 
financial principles and bringing them under financial regulation.  
13.  The experience of microfinance practitioners in many different settings worldwide underscores the 
proposition that the future for sustainable microfinance lies in a regulated, licensed environment. In most 
countries no other environment can enable large-scale, sustainable delivery of an increasing variety of 
financial services to effectively link the poor to the more developed sectors of the economy (Christen and 
Rosenberg 2000). When MFIs’ traditional (donor) sources of funds cannot keep pace with expansion in 
their lending business, MFIs need access to external finance. In addition to loans from upper-tier financial 
institutions and private institutional savings, securities issues (commercial paper) on the formal capital 
market may be feasible in financial sectors such as Bolivia’s or Peru’s, where microfinance institutions 
are recognized as legal entities and are an integral part of the financial system (box 1). 
 
Box 1. Transformation to Formal, Regulated Status Enhances Access to Commercial Funds 
 
One of the better known examples of NGO transformation is Bolivia’s Fomento a Iniciativas Económicas 
S.A. (FIE), a for-profit MFI offering individual loans to micro-enterprises in urban areas. It began lending in 
1988 as an NGO and grew its portfolio from US$4 million to US$12 million in only three years, with a debt-
equity ratio of 2:1. In early 1998 FIE secured its license to operate as a private finance fund regulated by 
the Superintendency of Banks. By year’s end the organization had been able to raise its debt-equity ratio to 
more than 6:1, mobilizing additional funding resources from institutional time deposits and increased credit 
lines from commercial banks. As a regulated, formal financial intermediary, FIE was able to attract 
institutional deposits and banks were more willing to increase their lending limits. With its newly acquired 
status as a financial intermediary regulated by the banking authority, it was able to become a private 
financial fund that played by universally understood rules enforced by a fairly tough banking 
superintendency. Bank creditors of FIE knew that the accounting rules it used to produce financial 
statements were the s ame as those that they themselves used, and that the same banking 
superintendency that exercised prudential oversight on them also closely monitored its liquidity reserve 
requirements, currency risk, portfolio quality, loan provisioning levels, and other potential problem areas. 
Source: von Stauffenberg (2001).  
 
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION  
14.  This study is underpinned by country case studies of the legal and regulatory framework for microfinance 
carried out in 2002 for Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania by separate teams under a joint project of the Africa 
Region and the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department (Gallardo and Randhawa 2003; 
Ouattara 2003; Steel and Andah 2003).
1 In preparing this review, the authors supplemented the findings 
from the country-specific case studies with information from other reports and studies on the regulatory 
framework for the financial sector and for microfinance in selected other countries.  
15.  Even though they are geographically and culturally diverse, Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania share 
characteristics that are typical of African countries where microfinance could be an important tool for 
poverty reduction: levels of economic development are low, though per capita income is growing; rural 
sectors are large; financial sectors are shallow; and poverty is widespread (as participants in the Highly 
                                                 
1  A team also undertook a case study of South Africa (not published), whose unique circumstances yield only limited 
lessons for this review. Participants at a December 2002 workshop reviewed and discussed the findings of the three 
country case studies featured in this study, together with an issues paper, as a basis for this comparative study. The case 
studies provide more details on the macroeconomic and policy context, the regulatory framework, the financial sector 
structure, and the key institutional players in the microfinance sectors of the three countries.    5 
Indebted Poor Countries program, all three countries prepare a poverty reduction strategy paper). While 
microfinance has been important in the three countries, they differ both in their approaches to legal and 
regulatory issues and in the nature of the institutions providing the services, including significant 
variations in the treatment and level of development of CFIs. This diversity was expected to make the 
study richer and its conclusions more robust. 
16.  The country studies were also intended to enhance World Bank advice to countries where it is actively 
involved in the development of the microfinance sector:  
•  In Benin, the Rural Savings and Loan Rehabilitation Projects I and II of 1990 and 1993, respectively, 
supported the establishment of MFIs and assisted the development of the Fédération des Caisses 
d’Épargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuel (Federation of Savings and Credit Cooperatives or 
FECECAM), the apex organization of credit unions. In addition, since November 1999 the Private 
Sector Development Project has supported the creation of two financial institutions, the Programme 
d’Appui au Développement des MicroEntreprises (Microenterprise Development Support Program or 
PADME) for credit to microenterprises, and the Programme d’Appui aux Petites et Moyennes 
Entreprises (Small and Medium Enterprise Support Program or PAPME), for credit to small and 
medium enterprises. 
•  In Ghana, the Bank’s Rural Finance Project in 1990–94 addressed the need for recapitalization and 
capacity building of rural banks, enabling the Bank of Ghana to classify at least half of them as having 
satisfactory status by 1996. Currently the Bank is taking the lead and working with the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development, the African Development Bank, and Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) to implement the Rural Financial Services Project. In addition to capacity 
building for rural and community banks (RCBs) and other MFIs, the project provides financial and 
technical assistance for establishing and operating a second-tier apex bank serving RCBs, which will 
eventually be delegated specific supervision functions as an auxiliary of the Bank of Ghana.  
•  For Tanzania, the Bank has prepared a Learning and Innovation Loan specifically to establish an 
appropriate policy and regulatory framework for microfinance. The loan is being implemented in 
conjunction with a financial sector restructuring and development loan. The Bank has, in the context 
of this larger financial sector loan, helped the government develop a national microfinance strategy, 
create the National Microfinance Bank to preserve the rural branches of the former National Bank of 
Commerce, and prepare the National Microfinance Bank for privatization.  
II. COMPARATIVE PROFILES  
17.  The macroeconomic environments in Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania are typical of many African countries. 
More than two-thirds of the population live in rural areas in Tanzania, slightly more than in Benin and 
Ghana and  above the 68 percent average for Sub-Saharan Africa (table 2). During the past 10 years each 
of the three countries has achieved gross domestic product (GDP) growth at average annual rates 
significantly higher than the rate of population growth rate, with the rate of growth of GDP accelerating in 
recent years. Also in all three countries the agriculture sector accounts for more than a third of GDP, with 
exports dominated by a single commodity (ginned cotton in Benin, cocoa in Ghana, and coffee in 
Tanzania), making them highly vulnerable to adverse changes in world prices for these commodities or 
declines in domestic production because of adverse weather conditions.  Of the three countries Benin is 
the smallest in terms of total population and percentage of the population living in rural areas. All three 
have per capita income levels lower than the average for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, although 
Benin’s gross national income per capita is higher than that in Ghana and Tanzania. Gross national 
income per capita in Benin is three times higher than the estimated poverty line for the country, compared 
with two times for Ghana and Tanzania.  A third of the total population falls below the national poverty 
line in Benin and Ghana, and slightly over 40 percent in Tanzania.   6 
 
Table 2. Selected Features of the Macroeconomic Environment, 2003 
Feature  Benin  Ghana  Tanzania  Sub-Saharan Africa 
Population (millions, 2002)  6.6  20.3  35.2  689.3 
Annual population growth (percent, 1995–2002)  2.6  2.2   2.5      2.5  
Annual labor force growth (percent, 2001-2010)  2.8   2.0     2.0   2.2 
Rural population (percent of total population), 2002  56.3  63.3   65.8  64.5  
Gross national income (US$ billions, 2003)a  2.5   5.5   9.7   310.9  
Annual GDP growth rate (percent, 2001–2002)   6.0   4.5   6.3   2.8 
Gross national income per capita (US$)a, 2002   380   270  290   450 
Gross domestic savings/GDP (percent), 2002  6.0  10.3  9.7  18.5 
Value added in Agriculture as a percentage of GDP, 2002             36.0   33.8  44.4  17.7 
Principal commodity export  Ginned cotton  Cocoa  Coffee  — 
National poverty line (US$ per person per year)   131   138   143  — 
Percent of population below national poverty lineb  33   31.4   41.6   — 
Depth of financial sector (percent)c, 2001  31.0   17.4  20.4  35.2 
Credit provided by banking sector (percent)d,  2001  4.6  0.8  9.6  74.2 
 
— Not available. 
a. Calculated using the Atlas method. 
b. Benin-1995; Ghana-1992; Tanzania-1993. 
c. M3/GDP. 
d. Domestic credits provided by banking sector /GDP.  
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators 2003; African Development Indicators 2004 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE FORMAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
18.   The financial sectors of Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania are relatively shallow: the degree of monetization of 
the economy as measured by the ratio of M3 to GDP is 31 percent for Benin, 17.4 percent for Ghana, and 
20.4 percent for Tanzania – somewhat below the level for Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP is rather low in each of the three countries, and 
especially in Ghana.  Each of the countries has undergone a period of restructuring and liberalization of 
the financial sector, wherein the government has privatized and reorganized banking institutions that it 
previously owned, controlled, and managed.  
Benin 
19.  At the end of 2002, Benin’s formal financial system consisted of a branch of the Banque Centrale des Etats 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African States or BCEAO), 7 private commercial banks, 2 
leasing and credit institutions, 7 insurance companies, and more than 600 microfinance and savings and 
loans associations. In the last two years two of the seven commercial banks were newly licensed and 
started operations and two NBFIs were liquidated. All the older banks were created during the early 
1990s. The government liquidated the three commercial banks it owned that were operating before this 
period following the collapse of the banking system as a result of the banking crisis of the late 1980s. The 
financial sector remains somewhat shallow, although at 26 percent the ratio of M2 to GDP is higher than 
for Ghana, Tanzania, and the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2002 credit to the private sector stood at 
only 12 percent of GDP, total credit extended by MFIs was equivalent to 10 percent of total financial 
sector credit, and MFIs held an estimated 10 percent of total financial sector deposits.   7 
Ghana 
20.  The Ghanaian financial system comprises the Central Bank of Ghana, a stock exchange, 3 large foreign 
banks, 3 banks controlled by the public sector, and 10 small or medium-sized private sector banks. The 16 
commercial banks have more than 300 branches throughout the country, and the Ghana Stock Exchange 
lists 21 companies. Ghana also has 115 RCBs, 3 discount houses, 2 building societies, 6 leasing 
companies, 8 finance companies, 9 deposit-taking savings and loan companies (S&Ls), and some 200 
credit unions. In 1999 the banking sector held more than two-thirds of total financial sector assets; 
however, the RCBs’ total assets were equivalent to only 3 percent of banking sector assets. The banking 
sector is characterized by a high level of concentration. At the end of 1999 government-owned banks held 
some 31 percent of total banking sector assets (23 percent in one), while foreign banks accounted for 36 
percent. 
Tanzania 
21.  When Tanzania began to reform its financial sector 1991 the banking sector comprised the Central Bank 
of Tanzania, six deposit-taking financial institutions, and three specialized banks (investment, housing, 
and the postal system). The financial system has since expanded rapidly, and by the end of 1998 the 
country had 19 licensed commercial banks with 17 operating, 3 limited-license regional and community 
banks, 9 mostly privately-owned insurance companies, 4 state-owned pension funds, 105 foreign 
exchange bureaus, and some 650 urban and rural CFIs. Tanzania established a stock exchange in 1998, 
and, in contrast to Benin and Ghana, it has a formal deposit insurance system. 
FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Regulatory and Supervisory Structure  
22.  In Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania, as in many other developing countries, a general banking law regulates the 
business of banking, which is strictly defined as the taking of voluntary deposits from the general public 
and the intermediation of those deposits into loans and other investments at the discretion and risk of the 
financial intermediary (rather than of the depositor). The central bank supervisory authority responsible 
for carrying out the provisions of the law issues the general and specific guidelines and requirements for 
licensing and prudential supervision of entities licensed to carry out banking business. 
Benin 
23.  Because Benin is a member of UMOA, its commercial banks and credit institutions are governed by the 
BCEAO (Law 90-018 of July 27, 1990) and the regional banking law and are subject to prudential 
supervision by the Regional Banking Commission. The regulatory framework for the financial sector is 
somewhat restrictive, in the sense that only licensed commercial banks, NBFIs, and CFIs can carry out 
financial intermediation. Before the advent of the regional microfinance law, commonly referred to as the 
PARMEC Law (PARMEC refers to the Projet d’Appui à la Réglementation sur les Mutuelles d’Epargne 
et de Crédit or  Project to Assist the Regulation of Savings and Credit Cooperatives) in the UMOA 
countries in 1993, institutional providers of microfinance services operating in Benin and other UMOA 
countries were subject to several laws, including the Cooperative Law, the Usury Law, and the Banking 
Law. The authorities’ desire to monitor a rapidly growing industry and to protect the industry’s clients, 
especially depositors, led to the common standard for regulating the provision of microfinance services. 
However, despite the variety of other microfinance organizational formats that operated in UMOA 
countries the law only covered credit unions. Benin passed legislation in 1997 to implement the PARMEC 
Law, which closely emulates the regional model law. Under the PARMEC Law only credit unions and 
their network federation can be granted fully fledged licenses. Other non-mutualist MFIs are permitted to 
operate for five years within the rules defined by a convention-cadre, a standard agreement signed by the 
Ministry of Finance. The PARMEC Law excludes small and informal microfinance organizations, but 
provides for their voluntary formalization and registration.   8 
Ghana 
24.  The regulatory structure for Ghana’s financial sector is characterized by a more conventional approach to 
prudential regulation of banking and financial institutions, wherein the central banking authority is a 
constitutionally autonomous and independent government agency. The regulatory framework for the 
tiered financial sector is more accommodating and inclusive than in Benin in that the banking and NBFI 
laws allow a range of banking institutions and NBFIs to engage in microfinance activities, even in the 
absence of a microfinance-specific regulatory framework. Until 2002 the Bank of Ghana divided 
prudential supervision activities between its Banking Supervision  Department and Nonbank Financial 
Institutions Department. The latter’s jurisdiction included certain financial institutions providing 
microfinance services, namely, deposit-taking S&Ls and credit unions, but the Banking Supervision 
Department is now responsible for these entities and also oversees RCBs. A provision in Ghana’s NBFI 
Law pertaining to the registration, licensing, and supervision of credit unions has never been applied, and 
is to be replaced by a separate credit union law that will divide these responsibilities between the Bank of 
Ghana and the Department of Cooperatives. 
Tanzania 
25.  The Bank of Tanzania’s Banking Supervision Directorate is responsible for prudential supervision of all 
licensed banking and financial institutions, while separate directorates are responsible for research and 
policy issues affecting different types of regulated banking and financial institutions. Tanzania’s 
regulatory framework for the financial sector accommodates several tiers of banking institutions and 
NBFIs that can provide microfinance services, namely, commercial banks, regional and rural community 
banks, and CFIs. Under the revised 2003 Banking Law, the Bank of Tanzania is responsible for regulating 
and supervising all CFIs whose deposits have surpassed an amount equivalent to the minimum core 
capital for a microfinance company. Tanzania has only recently passed a package of specialized laws to 
serve as the regulatory framework for microfinance. The new regulatory framework could constrain the 
commercialization and scaling up of microfinance services by heretofore unregulated MFIs, especially 
NGOs and CFIs, if relatively high minimum capitalization requirements and financial accounting, 
auditing, and reporting requirements erect unduly steep barriers to entry. Nevertheless, the regulations and 
minimum capitalization requirements are still in draft and may help overcome the restrictions in the law if 
stakeholders’ concerns are taken into account. 
Supervisory Capacity and Cost Considerations  
26.  Three considerations are  important in relation to prudential regulatory frameworks for microfinance 
institutions. One is the ongoing cost to the regulatory authority of supervising financial intermediaries 
much smaller than commercial banks, whose transactions differ significantly.
2 An important issue is 
whether or not the regulatory authorities have the institutional capacity and staff resources to supervise 
microfinance institutions. The second consideration is the cost incurred in creating the institutional 
capacity to carry out regulatory oversight of microfinance activities and institutions, which includes 
developing a knowledge of and familiarity with microfinance transactions and the tools for measuring 
performance and recognizing danger signals in microfinance operations and markets. The third 
consideration pertains to the incremental costs to microfinance institutions of having the required 
organizational, technical, and staff resources to comply with reporting requirements and supervisory 
procedures. However, applying a guideline that the benefits of regulation should exceed its costs entails 
                                                 
2    Supervision entails costs not only for the regulator, but also for the regulated institution, as illustrated by the experience 
of credit unions and rural banks in Ghana. In Peru, supervision fees collected by the National Federation of Credit 
Unions of Peru are enough to inspect only 40 of its 130 member credit unions each year (Westley 2001). As a further 
example, the management of BancoSol in Bolivia estimates that complying with the bank superintendency’s reporting 
requirements during its first year of operations (1992) generated a cost equivalent to 5 percent of the loan portfolio, 
even though this had declined to about 1 percent of the loan portfolio by 1999  (Christen and Rosenberg 2000). A third 
type of cost,  the most difficult to measure but potentially also most important,  is  the cost of market intervention, i.e. 
compared to a state of perfect competition (sometimes called structural costs). Keeping financial institutions out of the 
market by imposing high barriers to entry is a good example for this.   9 
practical difficulties. These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs in terms of the structures in 
each of the countries studied. 
Benin 
27.  Under the provisions of the PARMEC Law that governs all MFIs in UMOA countries, the supervision of 
microfinance is the responsibility of the ministry of finance in each country. The ministries are to conduct 
annual off-site and on-site supervision of MFIs, with the help of the BCEAO’s Microfinance Department, 
if requested. The Microfinance Unit of Benin’s Ministry of Finance was charged with supervising 85 
licensed MFIs in 2001, even though many of them did not mobilize deposits from the public. By 
comparison, the BCEAO’s Regional Banking Commission was responsible for 59 commercial banks in 
the UMOA region. Since the creation of the Microfinance Unit in 1998, it has only carried out 14 on-site 
inspections. Under the law, all licensed MFIs are required to submit their yearly financial statements to 
the Ministry of Finance; however, the law does not require MFIs to have their operations audited each 
year. The ministry can impose fines on MFIs that are late in submitting financial statements, but none has 
been levied thus far, implying a lack of enforcement of the rules. In 2000 the ministry received only 35 
financial statements, representing a compliance rate of 41 percent, and did not sanction noncompliant 
licensed MFIs. The delegated supervision arrangement has not been achieving the intended results, and 
the Microfinance Unit is overwhelmed by the regulatory task. A proposed new arrangement,  would 
entrust the BCEAO with direct supervision of the  largest MFIs in UMOA, including FECECAM, the 
largest network of credit unions in Benin, thereby relieving the Ministry of Finance of a heavy burden. 
Ghana 
28.  In addition to off-site surveillance and on-site examination, the Bank of Ghana has a special pool of nine 
experienced commercial bankers that it can assign to rural banks to temporarily take over for b ank 
managers so that they can take annual leave. A relief manager from the special pool spends an average of 
six weeks at a rural bank and uses the assignment to carry out a management audit of the rural bank and to 
test internal control and operating systems. While according to the NBFI Law the Bank of Ghana is 
responsible for the prudential supervision of credit unions, it has refrained from exercising that function 
because of a donor-financed project to strengthen the role of the apex body, the CUA. In the meantime, a 
proposed new credit union law is likely to result in delegating the primary prudential supervision of credit 
unions to the CUA, which would itself be licensed by the Bank of Ghana and report to a new credit union 
supervisory board that includes representatives of the Bank of Ghana and the Department of Cooperatives.  
29.  Enforcement mechanisms available to the Bank of Ghana include imposing fines or criminal sanctions, 
suspending bank activities or staff, revoking licenses, and appointing auditors and managers at distressed 
banks. Rural bank supervision is somewhat simplified by less cumbersome prudential reporting 
requirements, and the process has benefited from training programs organized by the Association of Rural 
Banks and the Ghana Micro Finance Institutions Network. Twenty-three supervisory staff oversee the 115 
rural banks with assets of ¢518 billion (US$69.1 million), compared with the 30 supervisors assigned to 
oversee 17 major banks with assets of ¢14,436 billion (US$1.9 million). Supervision of RCBs takes about 
six staff-weeks per year and of S&Ls about three or four staff-weeks per year (no data are available on the 
monetary costs).  
30.  Commercial banks, RCBs, and NBFIs do not pay explicit fees for supervision by the Bank of Ghana, 
although an indirect fee or tax is effectively collected through differential rates on liquidity reserves. 
Auditing fees for RCBs average around ¢10 million (US$1,300) per year. In 2000 on-site examinations 
covered 97 percent of rural banks, but reached 100 percent in 2001. Only about two-thirds of NBFIs were 
examined in 2000, but priority was given to deposit-taking NBFIs, and on-site examination of S&Ls was 
100 percent in 2000 and 2001.  Thus far the Bank of Ghana has revoked the licenses of 23 rural banks. 
31.  Of 219 credit unions registered by the Department of Cooperatives in 2000, the CUA only considered 159 
as fully fledged credit unions, with the remainder undergoing institutional development for full 
certification. A two-person team from the CUA and the Department of Cooperatives carries out annual 
examinations of credit unions, which takes a minimum of four days, and the credit unions are assessed a  10 
fee of ¢150,000 (US$20) per day or a minimum of ¢600,000 (US$80). The CUA’s annual audit of credit 
unions covered 92 percent of credit unions in 2001. 
Tanzania 
32.  The Banking Supervision Directorate, which has a total of 51 professional supervisors with an average of 
10 years’ experience each, is responsible for prudential supervision of licensed banks and NBFIs. The 
Banking Department has 29 supervisors, which covered close to 86 percent of all licensed banking and 
financial institutions in 2001. A full examination is conducted at least once a year for every commercial 
bank, NBFI, and community bank. On-site examination includes both head offices and all branch offices. 
Depending on a particular banking institution’s problem, the Bank of Tanzania may also conduct targeted 
examinations of any commercial bank, NBFI, regional bank, or community bank as and when 
circumstances require. Examination takes an average of six weeks for large banks and three weeks for 
medium and small banks. 
33.  SACCOs, which comprise the CFI sector in Tanzania, must be inspected by district cooperative officers, 
and the registrar or assistant registrar must examine their final audited accounts. The Cooperative Audit 
and Supervision Corporation, a parastatal entity with offices in every region, carries out external audits of 
SACCOs’ financial statements. A major problem of the SACCOs is that they tend not to use standard 
accounting procedures or to regularly maintain their records and do not comply with audit requirements. 
SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MICROFINANCE SECTOR 
34.  Well-organized and nationally coordinated commercial microfinance is a relatively new development in 
Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania, and microfinance umbrella or network organizations have been organized 
only within the past few years. These consist of the Professional Association of Microfinance Practitioners 
(known as Alafia) in Benin, t he Ghana Micro Finance Institutions Network (GHAMFIN), and the 
Tanzania Association of Micro Finance Institutions (TAMFI). In addition to undertaking policy advocacy 
and representation, accessing resources for and implementing institutional and staff capacity building 
programs, and offering a platform for the dissemination and exchange of best practices in microfinance, 
umbrella organizations have generally been instrumental in developing databases on their members’ 
operations, outreach, and financial standing. Nevertheless, the umbrella organizations in Benin, Ghana, 
and Tanzania are struggling to compile statistical databases on their member MFIs that can quickly 
provide up-to-date overviews of each country’s respective microfinance sector. The following subsections 
summarize the main types of MFIs and their characteristics in each of the countries studied. 
Benin 
35.  Despite its relatively small size, Benin has the largest number of MFIs in the Union Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine (West Africa Monetary Union or UMOA) and a comparably diverse array of institutions. As of 
the end of 2001 the MFI sector had more than 600 retail  organizations. around 700,000 clients, CFAF 30 
billion (US$40 million) in savings deposits, and CFAF 25 billion (US$33.3 million) in outstanding loans.
2 
Organizations engaged in microfinance in Benin and the rest of UMOA are classified into three main 
categories: credit unions, credit-only MFIs, and donor projects with a microfinance component. 
36.  Credit unions’ dominance of the microfinance industry is closely related to the evolution of Benin’s 
formal financial sector, as the government encouraged the establishment of retail rural and microfinance 
organizations, including FECECAM, the largest credit union network, in response to the collapse of the 
banking sector in the late 1980s. By the end of 2001 FECECAM dominated the microfinance industry, 
holding 94 percent of savings deposits and 61 percent of total outstanding loans. The network had 298,000 
member-shareholders in 96 primary-level credit unions, CFAF 20 billion (US$26.7 million) in deposits, 
and CFAF 12 billion (US$16 million) in outstanding loans.  
                                                 
2 The exchange rate used throughout this paper is US$1 = CFAF 750  11 
37.  Credit-only MFIs are the second largest player in Benin’s microfinance industry, with each having more 
than CFAF 1 billion (US$1.3 million) in total outstanding loans in 2001. These MFIs are FINADEV, the 
microfinance outlet of a commercial bank with CFAF 1.1 billion (US$1.5 million) in outstanding loans; 
PADME, which provides microcredit to microenterprises and has outstanding loans of CFAF 6.8 billion 
(US$9.1 million); and PAPME, which provides financial services to micro-entrepreneurs and small and 
medium enterprises and has outstanding loans of CFAF 7.1 billion (US$9.5 million). Both PADME and 
PAPME were originally World Bank–supported projects, but are now independent nonprofit associations. 
By the end of 2001, credit-only institutions provided 34 percent of all loans in the microfinance industry. 
38.  Donor projects with a microfinance component are implemented through numerous small NGOs. Some 
are organized as credit unions, including the Fédération Nationale des Caisses Rurales d’Épargne et de 
Crédit (the National Federation of Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives or FENACREP), the second 
largest network of credit unions in Benin, which was created in 1992 by the NGO Sasakawa Global 2000; 
the Projet d’Association et d’Entraide des Femmes (ASSEF), a women’s self-help group project supported 
by the Swiss government that started in 1992 for women organized within small credit unions; and the 
Centre Béninois pour le Développement des Initiatives de Base (the Benin Center for the Development of 
Local Initiatives or CBDIBA), which was created by a French NGO to help set up a number of credit 
union MFIs such as Convergence 2000, as well non–credit union MFIs such as the Caisses Villageoises 
d’Epargne et de Crédit (CAVECA, village-level savings and credit associations). These projects represent 
less than 5 percent of the microfinance market in terms of outstanding loans.  
39.  Informal microfinance mechanisms in Benin include moneykeepers, moneylenders, rotating savings and 
credit associations or tontines, and the “yes-yes” system.
3 Convergence 2000, a local NGO, has helped 
start a yes-yes system with the ultimate goal of transforming it into a formal microfinance organization. 
Ghana 
40.  Ghana’s formal and semiformal MFIs reach some 1.5 million members and depositors, of whom less than 
a third have loans. These MFIs include 115 RCBs with over a million recorded depositors and about 
150,000 loan accounts (some of them groups of 5 to 35 members), 253 credit unions with over 120,000 
members, and 9 S&Ls with more than 160,000 depositors and 10,000 borrowers. Some 50 NGO MFIs 
reach a total of about 60,000 borrowers, but most of these (as well as even smaller community-based 
organizations) have fewer than 1,000 clients each. The Ghana Micro Finance Institutions Network, 
originally established in the late 1990s by a group of leading MFIs, cuts across formal, semiformal, and 
informal institutions, and is being restructured as an umbrella body governed by representatives of their 
respective associations. The objectives of the Ghana Micro Finance Institutions Network include serving 
as a knowledge center for the industry and monitoring and benchmarking industry performance. 
41.  Rural and community banks. During the 1990s some of the RCBs adopted a more commercial approach 
and introduced innovative programs, often in collaboration with NGOs that offered proven microfinance 
methodologies, such as Freedom from Hunger’s Credit with Education  program. A few RCBs have 
succeeded in expanding to more than 20,000 clients and reaching high levels of operational and financial 
sustainability.
4 On average, however, Ghana’s RCBs are relatively small compared even with African 
MFIs, especially in terms of lending, though many have become relatively profitable mainly because of 
high interest rates on treasury bills and high reserve requirements that forestalled risky lending (table 3). 
                                                 
3    The yes-yes system (referred to as susu collectors in Ghana) allows a client to save regularly via  an informal, 
individual money collector who collects a daily amount fixed by the client and returns the accumulated sum minus one 
day’s deposit as a fee at the end of the month. Collectors sometimes extend loans to their clients by advancing the 
monthly total. 
4   For example, in 1998 the Nsoatreman Rural Bank was reported to have 25,587 depositors with an average balance of 
US$38, 17,584 borrowers with an average loan size of US$190, 130 percent operational self-sufficiency, and portfolio 
in arrears of less than 4 percent.  12 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Ghana’s Rural Banks and Credit Unions with African MFIs, End of 2000  
Indicator (average)  African MFIsa  Ghanaian rural banks  Ghanaian credit unions 
Number of clients  7,374  8,488  405 
Average loan balance outstanding per client (US$)  119  30  153 
Total loan portfolio (US$)  690,027  251,924  65,180 
Total assets (US$)  1,612,029  841,102  110,961 
Capital/assets (percent)  60.3   2.6   3.5  
Return on assets (percent)  -16.1  4.4   n.a. 
 
n.a. Not applicable. 
Note: Ghanaian S&Ls are not included. 
a. Leading MFIs that report to the MicroBanking Bulletin. 
Source: Kowubaa, Ltd. (2000, p. 60).  
 
42.  Savings and loan companies. The first S&L license went to Women’s World Banking Ghana in 1994, 
representing the first transformation of an NGO into a licensed financial institution. Its success, however, 
has been limited, and a number of S&Ls are suffering from portfolio problems and having difficulty 
complying with central bank regulations. Some of them represent entrepreneurs with little experience in 
financial services, but with surplus funds and high motivation. Sinapi Aba Trust is expected to become the 
second transformed NGO, and  EMPRETEC, an NGO that provides excellent training for micro-
enterprises and small businesses, is also trying to meet the paid-up capital requirement needed to be 
licensed as an S&L. 
43.  Credit unions. The past weak financial performance of credit unions has been due in large part to their 
organization as cooperative societies with a welfare focus, and in particular to their policy of low interest 
rates. In recent years Ghana’s Cooperative Credit Union Association (CUA) has moved to improve the 
commercial orientation and financial reporting of its primary societies, as well as its own financial 
sustainability. The CUA is an innovator in providing both credit insurance, which pays off the outstanding 
loan  balance in case of the death of a borrower, and a contractual savings program, which matches 
savings, up to a limit, if held at death or to maturity. Nevertheless, Credit unions are relatively small, with 
an average of 400 to 500 members per society, although theUS$153 average loan size is well above that 
for African MFIs, as well as for RCBs.
5  
44.  Since 1989 the government has launched several special credit schemes, usually at subsidized rates, that 
have generally reached few people and have had extremely poor recovery rates. Microcredit schemes have 
also been used in poverty alleviation programs and the district assembly common funds. In 2001  the 
government launched the Emergency Social Relief Project to provide US$57 million in business loans 
during 2002–04 to the economically active poor at a 20 percent annual interest rate. The RCBs and NGOs 
through which disbursements are made often do not have autonomy in selecting the beneficiaries. The 
main threat to sustainable microfinance from these government programs comes from the negative effects 
on MFIs’ efforts to mobilize savings and to collect on loans from borrowers whose willingness to repay is 
typically low when they perceive loans as coming from government or donor funds at subsidized rates. 
Tanzania 
45.  The principal institutional providers of microfinance services include the National Microfinance Bank and 
two other commercial banks that have established internal divisions dedicated to microfinance, the 
Tanzania Postal Bank and three regional and rural unit banks that fall under the NBFI category; urban- 
                                                 
5   This is probably because 59 percent of the credit unions are workplace based, with 71 percent of the CUA’s 
membership serving a more middle-class, salaried clientele than the community-based ones.   13 
and rural-based CFIs, and a number of microcredit programs supported by international donors through 
NGO MFIs.
6 
46.  Licensed banks. The microfinance-focused operations of the National Microfinance Bank and the other 
regular commercial banks are fairly new start-ups, and outreach is low to date. The National Microfinance 
Bank’s advantage consists of its network of 104 branches through which microfinance operations can be 
run, but fewer than 20 branches have so far been prepared to offer microfinance services. Some 2,810 
loans are outstanding out of the 5,072 loans that have been disbursed since August 2000, and the 
outstanding loan portfolio stood at T Sh 907.5 million (US$1.134 million) at the end of 2001.
7 The 
National Microfinance Bank has a fairly large base of savings and time deposits: about T Sh 70 billion 
(US$87.5 million) in outstanding savings deposits from 670,000 accounts as of the end of 1999 (Bank of 
Tanzania 2001). The average savings deposit balance is about T Sh 105,000 (US$130) per account. 
47.  Postal Bank. The main objective of the Tanzania Postal Bank has been to mobilize local savings and 
promote the savings habit among small-scale savers, particularly individuals. It provides savings deposit 
services in all post offices. As of the end of 2000 the Tanzania Postal Bank had slightly more than 1 
million deposit accounts serviced through a network of 4 branches and 15 operating units based in larger 
units of the postal administration, which has 121 post offices and stations throughout the country. 
48.  Regional and community banks.  Tanzania has lower-level tiers of licensed banking institutions—the 
regional bank category and the rural unit community bank category—meant to encourage the 
transformation of NGO MFIs to licensed status. Nevertheless, despite the reasonably low minimum 
capitalization requirement levels, only three banks fall into the regional or rural unit community bank 
categories, and both policymakers and microfinance practitioners need to examine and assess the factors 
underlying this state of affairs. To some extent these lower-level banking tiers are similar to those in 
Ghana, which has seen a larger number of participants in lower tiers. As with a significant segment of 
Tanzania’s microfinance industry, operating and financial information on the regional and rural unit 
community banks are not readily available. 
49.  SACCOs constitute the largest segment of Tanzania’s microfinance industry. The total membership base 
of SACCOs is some 130,000, with urban SACCOs accounting for 47,000 members and rural SACCOs for 
some 83,000 as of the end of 2000. Total members’ funds amounted to US$17 million equivalent, with the 
bulk of both members’ shares (US$4.7 million) and members’ deposits (US$9.4 million) coming from the 
urban SACCOs. Rural SACCOs had an average of US$34 in shares and deposits per member, about 
1/10th the average per urban SACCO member  
50.  NGOs. Among the larger microfinance NGOs in terms of outreach and client base at the end of 2001 were 
the Mennonite Economic Development Association, which uses the individual lending methodology in 
catering to about 4,000 micro-entrepreneurs,
8 and the Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development 
Enterprises (PRIDE)-Tanzania, which is affiliated with the Kenya-based PRIDE-Africa and uses the 
solidarity or group-based lending methodology. A former government-led program, the Presidential Trust 
Fund, was privatized in 2000 and has been operating as a microfinance NGO. The Presidential Trust Fund 
has five branches through which its client base of 8,000 can access microfinance loans under a group 
lending approach. Tanzania has a number of other NGO-based microfinance loan programs, such as the 
Foundation for International Community Assistance-Tanzania (FINCA), which are s upported by 
international donor agencies and networks, but operational and market outreach data are not easily 
available. 
 
                                                 
6   A unit bank is an institution that is licensed/authorized to operate only from one office location. 
7    The exchange rate for Tanzanian Shillings used throughout this paper is US$1 = T Sh 800. 
8   The Mennonite Economic Development Association sold its operations to the National Microfinance Bank in 2002.  14 
III. FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MICROFINANCE 
BASIC FEATURES OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
51.  The three countries in the study have similar prudential regulatory frameworks for banking institutions and 
divergent regulatory regimes for non-bank and NGO MFIs and for membership-based CFIs. Banking 
institutions are subject to licensing and full prudential supervision, which may be defined as off-site 
monitoring and reporting and on-site examination to ensure compliance with stipulated prudential 
standards for activities, operations, fitness and propriety of directors and officers, and internal governance. 
52.  A country’s legal and regulatory framework  governs microfinance services and their institutional 
providers and specifies the activities, services, and products that are subject to regulation; the manner in 
which they may be offered; the institutions that can provide them; and the legal relationships and package 
of rights, responsibilities, and remedies between providers and recipients of transactions. A legal and 
regulatory framework that permits sustainable microfinance consists of several components: (a) the 
microfinance law; (b) the implementing administrative regulations; (c) the related laws and regulations; 
and (d) the executing administrative agencies, properly staffed and organized. The key features by 
category of institution are summarized as follows
9: 
•  Informal providers of microfinance services, such as rotating or accumulating savings and credit 
associations, are neither registered nor regulated. Semiformal providers  generally consist of 
institutional providers of microfinance services that are dependent on other people’s money, that is, 
grant funds from donors and government programs. They are legally registered, but in Ghana and 
Tanzania, as in most other countries, they are not regulated or supervised. These institutional providers 
are mainly multipurpose NGOs engaged in microcredit, usually organized as nonprofit foundations or 
associations. However, Benin requires entities funded by donor grants, such as PADME and PAPME, 
to be registered, licensed, and prudentially regulated under a convention-cadre agreement with the 
Ministry of Finance.  
•  Credit unions in Benin that are funded by members’ capital contributions and savings deposits must be 
registered, licensed, and prudentially regulated under the provisions of the PARMEC Law, including 
both primary-level credit unions and second-tier CFI federations such as FECECAM and FENACREP. 
In contrast, primary-level CFIs in Ghana and Tanzania and their second- and upper-tier federation 
associations—the CUA in Ghana, the Savings and Credit Cooperative Union League of Tanzania, and 
the Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives—are registered with the Department of Cooperatives and 
regulated under the provisions of the respective countries’ laws on cooperatives. Unlike in Benin, the 
central bank supervisory authority does not prudentially supervise these CFIs. 
•  MFIs funded by shareholders’ capital funds and retail public deposits, i.e., commercial banks in 
Tanzania, RCBs in Ghana, and NBFIs (regional banks, rural unit community banks, and the Postal 
Bank in Tanzania and deposit-taking S&Ls in Ghana), are subject to registration, licensing, and full 
prudential regulation by the central banking supervisory authority. Benin currently does not have any 
commercial banks or NBFIs directly involved in retail microfinance, except for FINADEV, a 
microfinance subsidiary of a commercial bank. 
53.  Entities that provide microcredit services to micro and small enterprises and low-income households in the 
countries studied are typically organized as civil society nonprofit institutions (NGOs). When the laws of 
the countries under w hich they are established do not expressly permit or prohibit extending small 
amounts of often unsecured loans using other people’s money (grants and donations), there may be some 
ambiguity about the practice of charging commercial rates of interest on loans under a tax-exempt status 
as a nonprofit organization.  Thresholds levels of microfinance intermediation activities which subject 
MFIs to regulation are as follows: 
                                                 
9  The distinguishing features of the standard legal framework for different types of organizations that provide microfinance 
services are highlighted in an Appendix table.  15 
•  NGOs involved in microfinance in Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania are registered legal entities. In Ghana 
and Tanzania such NGOs are not subject to any forms of nonprudential or prudential supervision and 
generally provide microcredit services only. Any deposits they take from borrowers are in the form of 
nonvoluntary security deposits, which the NGO returns to the borrowers when they have paid off their 
loans or retains as security against further loans. Benin’s PARMEC law requires both  membership-
based credit unions and non–credit union microfinance NGOs to be registered and licensed.
10  
•  Taking voluntary deposits from the public on a retail basis for intermediation into loans and 
investments at the risk of the intermediating institution activates different thresholds of regulatory 
oversight and prudential supervision in different countries. In all  three countries the business of 
mobilizing and intermediating deposits from the public is reserved exclusively for institutions that have 
been specifically organized for banking and finance and have obtained the required license from the 
central banking authority.
  11 The licensing and authorization procedures usually stipulate minimum 
capitalization requirements at entry and subsequent compliance with various prudential standards and 
requirements, as summarized in table 4. 
•  Each of the countries has banking and NBFI categories, but Ghana and Tanzania have more than one 
tier of licensed banking institutions that offer microfinance as a specialized niche as well as 
commercial banks that have dedicated microfinance operations.  
Table 4. Thresholds of Intermediation Activities Subject to Regulation and Licensing, 2002  
Type of institution  Benin  Ghana  Tanzania 
NGO MFIs  Providing microcredits to clients 
(must secure authorization from 
Microfinance Unit, Ministry of 
Finance; no MCR is required) 




Taking deposits from and making 
loans to members (no MCR is 
required). 
 
Subject to registration and 
regulation by the Department of 
Cooperatives (no MCR is 
required).  
Subject to registration and regulation 
by the Department of Cooperatives 
(no MCR is required).  
 
Other NBFIs  None involved in microfinance 
 
Taking savings deposits and 
making microloans (MCR is US$2 
million for S&Ls)  
 
No NBFIs involved in microfinancea 
Limited-service 
specialized banks 
 Taking deposits from and making 
loans to clients via convention-
cadre (no MCR is required). 
 
Taking savings deposits and 
making microloans (MCR for 
RCBs is US$20,000) 
 
Taking savings deposits and making 
microloans(MCR is $250,000 for 
regional banks and US$62,500 for 
rural unit banks) 
 
Full service commercial 
banks 
None directly involved in retail 
microfinance 
Making wholesale loans to and 
taking deposits from other MFIs 
None involved in microfinance  Full service deposits, checking, and 
savings; commercial bank license 
from the Bank of Tanzania is required 
(MCR is US$1.25 million) 
 
 
MCR Minimum capitalization requirements. 
a. Some reports group regional banks and rural unit banks under the NBFI category. 
Source: Gallardo and Randhawa (2003); Ouattara (2003); Steel and Andah (2003). 
 
                                                 
10   In South Africa any registered legal entity that extends personal microloans of less than R 10,000 for less than 36 
months at interest rates above the Usury Law ceiling is required to register with the Micro Finance Regulatory Council 
and secure prior authorization and exemption from the Usury Act. This regulation applies to a diverse range of 
financial institutions, including NGOs, commercial banks, and CFIs. 
11   Ghana’s banking laws define “public” as 20 or more persons (legal or natural), and  exclude small, informal, common-
bond groups.   16 
PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS FOR LICENSED MFIS 
54.  The key prudential standards imposed by regulatory agencies of Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania on licensed 
institutional providers of microfinance services consist of minimum capitalization requirements and 
capital adequacy levels, asset quality standards, limits on risk exposure, and liquidity management 
guidelines. The following subsections discuss the different standards. 
Minimum Capitalization Requirements  
55.  Minimum capitalization requirements (MCR) are intended to ensure an adequate financial cushion for 
institutions’ operations and serve to restrict entry to licensed entities permitted to mobilize and 
intermediate deposits from the public. From the perspective of the financial systems approach, MCR 
should be set at levels that would enable MFIs to become integrated with the formal financial system 
while maintaining prudential standards. Applying the same MCR as for commercial banks could be 
considered an excessive barrier to entry, given the generally smaller scale and restricted scope of 
operations of MFIs . However, setting the MCR too low risks excessive entry relative to the supervisory 
authorities’ capacity to enforce prudential standards and the MFIs’ capacity to sustain successful 
intermediation of deposits.  
56.  The MCR should be viewed as a primary tool for rationing scarce regulatory and supervisory resources 
available to the regulators and supervisors, rather than as an instrument for promoting and propagating the 
entry of new intermediaries into microfinance. The setting of MCR levels should balance the objective of 
opening the formal financial system to MFIs with a realistic assessment of how many additional deposit-
taking MFIs the relevant authorities would be able to prudentially supervise with a reasonable capacity 
building program and how many MFIs would be likely to enter at different MCR levels.  
57.  The MCR for specialized banks and microfinance-oriented NBFIs in Ghana and Tanzania have generally 
been low enough to encourage the establishment and operation of microfinance providers as licensed 
institutions with the authorization to mobilize savings and time deposits from the community at large. 
However, as table 5 shows, recent changes are more restrictive.  
Table 5. Minimum Capital and Adequacy Requirements for Licensed MFIs, 2002  
Requirement 
Benin: 




NBFIs, and credit unions 
Tanzania: 
licensed banks and MFIsa 
Minimum capital  No minimum level required   §  Rural banks: US$67,000 
§  S&Ls: US$2 million since 2001, 
up from US$15,000 to –
US$22,000 during 1993–99 
§  Commercial banks: US$5 
million 
§  Regional banks: US$250,000 
§  Rural banks: US$62,500 
Microfinance companies: 
US$1.25 million (stipulated 
by new law) 
Capital adequacy (capital 
as a percentage of risk 
assets) 
No minimum ratio specified  §  Rural banks: 6% 
§  S&Ls: 10% 
§  Credit unions: 10% 
6% 
 
a. Data for Tanzania are as June 2003.   
Source: Gallardo and Randhawa (2003); Ouattara (2003); Steel and Andah (2003). 
58.  Benin’s licensing framework does not prescribe MCR for the licensed credit unions or for the non–credit 
union MFIs authorized to operate by the Ministry of Finance.  In Ghana, the MCR is only a modest hurdle 
for RCBs, but no longer for S&Ls.  The recent increase in MCR to US$2 million is 15 times the 1998 
level in local currency. In part, this increase reflects concerns by the supervisory authorities about the 
failure of many S&Ls to meet prudential standards and about their own capacity to handle the growing 
number of applications for new entrants. The MCR now constitutes a significant barrier to entry and  17 
corresponds to about 60 percent of the capitalization required for domestic banks.
12 Ghanaian credit 
unions are not subject to MCR.  For Tanzania, the minimum capitalization requirements for regional 
banks and rural community banks appear to be at fairly accessible levels for investors in and promoters of 
institutional microfinance. The response, however, has been limited: only one regional bank and two rural 
community banks have been organized. The recently enacted Law on Microfinance Companies appears 
unlikely to foster significant new entry, as the currently unregulated or unlicensed MFIs are unlikely to 
achieve the stipulated (but still being discussed) MCR of T Sh 1 billion. Tanzanian credit unions are not 
subject to MCR.  
Capital Adequacy  
59.  In Ghana, the capital adequacy standard (CAR) prescribed for banks, including rural banks, is 6 percent of 
risk assets. A higher standard of 10 percent of risk assets is prescribed for S&Ls and deposit-taking 
NBFIs. The Ghana Credit Union Association follows the World Council of Credit Unions standard of 10 
percent of total assets. In Tanzania, regional banks and rural community banks are subject to a uniform 
CAR of 6 percent of risk assets. No prudential standards for capital adequacy are imposed on credit 
unions in Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania other than voluntary norms recommended by international CFI 
networks. As credit unions in Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania are not subject to minimum capitalization 
requirements, consistent with international practices that allow easy entry for member-based CFIs, this 
puts the burden of prudential regulation on the maintenance of CAR, for which measurement and 
standards should be similar for CFIs and for banking institutions.  
60.  The CAR applicable to licensed MFIs in Ghana and Tanzania appear to be lower than is prudent, 
especially because shareholders of MFIs generally have difficulty in quickly responding to calls for 
additional capital infusion. For a number of reasons (see Christen and Rosenberg 2000), self-sufficient 
MFIs (other than rural banks) in the Microfinance Information Exchange database maintain a higher ratio 
of capital funds to total assets compared to commercial banks, ranging from 17 percent for rural banks, 24 
percent for regular banks, 31 percent for CFIs, and 40 percent for non-bank MFIs. 
Asset Quality  
61.  In principle, recognizing and setting aside provisions for delinquent loans should be handled more 
aggressively for MFIs than for commercial b anks, given the relatively short-term nature and 
unconventional collateral typical of microfinance portfolios. Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania vary 
significantly in how they classify loans as delinquent and in how they provision for possible losses. Only 
Benin  requires provisioning at the time a loan is classified as delinquent, that is, when a payment is 
overdue by 90 days or more. A loan is delinquent when overdue by 31 days or more in Tanzania, but 
provisioning is required only when a loan is overdue by more than 180 days. Ghana is the most restrictive, 
classifying a microfinance loan as delinquent when a scheduled payment is 1 day overdue and requiring 
provisioning after 60 days. Provisioning at 40 percent is required when a loan is delinquent for a period 
between 61 and up to 90 days in Ghana and for 181 days or more in Tanzania. Provisioning at 100 percent 
is required when a loan is delinquent for 151 or more days in Ghana, and for 360 days or more in Benin 
and Tanzania (table 6).
13  
Table 6. Asset Quality Standards for Licensed MFIs, 2002  
                                                 
12  This capital adequacy ratio may be more appropriate for other categories of NBFIs that book considerably more assets 
than the typical S&L (or NGO). In general, Ghanaian rural banks and S&Ls have faced difficulties in raising additional 
funds from shareholders to meet increased paid-in capital requirements. Nevertheless, a new specialized MFI with 
international funding has been able to raise sufficient capital to become licensed, although the Ghanaian ownership 
share dropped from 25 to 2.5 percent following the increase in the capital requirement. 
13 Global best practice in microfinance is not rigid and allows for some degree of flexibility based on the maturity profiles 
and amortization periods of different categories of microfinance loans. For instance, for microfinance loan categories 
with average maturities of 180 days and with amortization payments scheduled every two weeks (or 15 days), none of 
the full or 100 percent provisioning guidelines for Benin, Tanzania, or even Ghana would make sense or be considered 
prudent business practice, because the period of loan delinquencies would have exceeded the original maturity dates 












Classification of loan as delinquent  = 90 days  1 day overdue  = 31 days 
Provisioning at 40 percent or more 
for delinquent loans  = 90 days  > 60 days but < 90 days  = 181 days 
Provisioning at 100 percent for 
delinquent loans  = 360 days  > 150 days   = 360 days 
Reserve for loan losses  n.a.  1 percent general reserve + specific 
loan provisions(basket basis) 
2 percent general reserve + 
specific loan provisions 
General reserve  15 percent of net income 
annually 
1 percent of loans outstanding   2 percent of loans 
outstanding 
 
n.a. Not applicable. 
Source: Gallardo and Randhawa (2003); Ouattara (2003); Steel and Andah (2003). 
Risk Exposure Limits  
62.  Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania have stringent ceilings based on an institution’s net worth with respect to 
loans to any single borrower as well as for connected lending (table 7). The prudential standards that are 
particularly restrictive for institutions providing microfinance services are the ceilings on unsecured loans 
in Ghana and Tanzania and on fixed assets in Tanzania. Ghana has no aggregate ceiling on unsecured 
loans, but the single borrower limit for unsecured loans is 10 percent of net worth. Licensed banks in 
Tanzania are subject to a ceiling on fixed assets, set at 10 percent of net worth, and a ceiling on unsecured 
loans set at 5 percent of net worth (the new Law on Microfinance also places a single borrower limit of 1 
percent of core capital on unsecured loans).  
63.  These regulations constrain downscaling by commercial banks into microfinance and inhibit MFIs from 
seeking licensed/prudentially supervised status, because virtually all microfinance loans are unsecured as 
the term is defined in manuals of regulations and prudential standards issued by central bank supervisory 
authorities. Third party personal guarantees; informal or semiformal security pledges on movable 
collateral, for example, small equipment; and similar methods MFIs typically use to secure loans do not 
qualify as acceptable collateral or security for loan obligations under conventional prudential standards. 
Furthermore, microfinance loans will not meet loan documentation standards required under currently 
accepted conventions, because most microfinance borrowers cannot present audited financial statements 
or operating records for the micro-enterprises and small businesses they operate.
14 
                                                 
14 To accommodate microfinance lending activities by licensed institutions, the Philippine Central Bank has undertaken a 
series of moves intended to recognize the fundamental structure of a microfinance loan by defining what it will 
recognize as loans  for microfinance and adjusting the applicable manuals of regulations for and reporting on 
microfinance loans. One result is that the risk weighting of unsecured microfinance loans relative to core capital is 75 
percent instead of the 100 percent for unsecured commercial loans.   19 




credit unions and authorized 
MFIs 
Ghana: 
licensed banks, NBFIs, 




Ceiling on total loans  200 percent of total deposits  No ceiling specified  No ceiling specified 
Unsecured loans ceiling  No ceiling specified  No ceiling specified  10 percent of core capital  
Single borrower limit  10 percent of total deposits  §  Unsecured loans: 10 percent of 
net worth 
§  Secured loans: 25 percent of net 
worth for banks; 15 percent of net 
worth for NBFIs and S&Ls 
25 percent of core capital 
Connected lending limit  20 percent of total deposits  §  Unsecured loans (individual): 0.67 
percent of net worth 
§  Secured loans (individual): 2 
percent of net worth 
§  Unsecured loans (aggregate): 10 
percent of net worth  
Less than or equal to the value of the 
officer’s shares and deposits; in total 
less than or equal to 25percent of the 
bank’s net worth 
Ceiling on fixed assets  No ceiling specified  No ceiling specified  10 percent of net worth 
 
a. Data for Tanzania are as of June 2003. 
Source: Gallardo and Randhawa (2003); Ouattara (2003); Steel and Andah (2003). 
Liquidity Risk  
64.  Credit unions and licensed MFIs in Benin and licensed banks, and deposit-taking NBFIs in Ghana and 
Tanzania are required to maintain primary liquidity reserves against deposit liabilities. The requirement is 
15 percent of total deposits in Benin and 20 percent of demand deposits in Tanzania (table 8). A related 
requirement in Tanzania is that total loans may not exceed 80 percent of total deposits. For S&Ls in 
Ghana the primary reserve is 10 percent, plus a 15 percent secondary reserve on total deposits. Ghana’s 
Credit Union Association requires member credit unions to maintain a 10 percent reserve on deposits. In 
an effort to improve the solvency of rural banks in Ghana, the secondary reserve requirement on total 
deposits was raised to 52 percent in 1996, in addition to the 10 percent primary reserve requirement. By 
restricting risky loans and forcing investment in treasury bills with high interest rates (more than 30 
percent per year), this restraint helped raise the number of rural banks rated as satisfactory. Nevertheless, 
it severely hampered their ability to serve their intended rural clientele, and the authorities subsequently 
lowered the secondary reserve requirement to 20 to 30 percent in 2002, depending on the loan recovery 
rate of each individual rural bank. Credit unions and licensed MFIs in Benin must comply with a specified 
liquidity ratio, namely, current assets must not exceed  80 percent of current liabilities, and a maturity 
matching standard, where medium- to long-term assets must be fully covered by matching medium- and 
long-term liabilities. This is a fairly difficult standard to meet because of the dearth of medium- to long-
term deposits or borrowed funds in Benin as in many other developing countries.  20 




credit unions and 
authorized MFIs 
Ghana: 
licensed banks, NBFIs, 




Required reserves  15 percent of total deposits  §  Rural banks: 6 percent 
§  S&Ls: 10 percent 
§  Credit unions: 10 percent 
20 percent of demand deposits 
Secondary reserves  n.a.    §  Rural banks: 52 percent of total 
deposits 
§  S&Ls: 15 percent of total 
deposits  
No prudential standard specified 
Liquidity ratio  Current assets must not exceed  
80 percent  of current liabilities  
No prudential standard specified  Total loans may not exceed 80 
percent of deposits 
Asset:liability matching of 
medium- and long-term 
liabilities to medium- and 
long-term assets   100 percent  No prudential standard specified  No prudential standard specified 
 
n.a. Not applicable. 
Source: Gallardo and Randhawa 2003; Ouattara 2003; Steel and Andah 2003.  
Prudential Surveil lance 
65.  The tools and mechanisms for prudential surveillance are fairly similar in the three countries: making use 
of external auditors to review financial operations and reports, requiring the submission of periodic 
reports on operations and financial results, and having supervisory staff carry out on-site examinations 
and audits. The exception is Benin, where credit unions and licensed MFIs are not required to have their 
financial statements and certification examined by external auditors. 
Deposit Protectio n 
66.  Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with relatively low 
levels of financial and institutional development. As some of the empirical literature points out, 
differences in deposit insurance design may affect discipline in private financial markets, banking 
stability, financial development, and the efficacy of crisis resolution measures. The primary goals of a 
deposit insurance system are to contribute to the stability of a country’s financial system and to protect 
less financially sophisticated depositors from losing their deposits when banks fail. The recently 
completed work of the Financial Stability Forum’s Working Group on Deposit Insurance underscores the 
following three main findings (Bank for International Settlements 2001):  
•  An explicit deposit insurance system is preferable to implicit protection if it clarifies the authorities’ 
obligations to depositors and limits the scope for discretionary decisions that may result in arbitrary 
actions. 
•  A deposit insurance system needs to be properly designed, well implemented, and understood by the 
public in order to be credible and to avoid moral hazard. 
•  A deposit insurance system needs to be part of a well-designed financial safety net that is supported 
by strong prudential regulation and supervision, effective laws that are enforced, and sound 
accounting and disclosure regimes. 
67.  The existence and operation of an explicit deposit insurance system can provide supplementary regulation 
and supervision of institutions that are licensed to accept deposits from the public, to the extent that the 
entity providing deposit insurance has the legal power to examine and evaluate the financial and 
operational soundness of banking and financial institutions with insured deposits. The supplemental 
examination and evaluation is usually separate from the prudential supervision of the central bank or 
supervisory authority, as in the case of the Philippines and Tanzania. For purposes of comparison, table 9  21 
presents deposit insurance profiles for these two countries and for Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, and 
Uganda.
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Equatorial Guinea  1999  ECU 3,557 (approx 3 x GNI per capita); 
excludes interbank deposits.  
Risk based: 0.15 percent 
of deposits + 0.5 percent 






Kenya  1985  US$1,750 (approx 5 x GNI per capita); 
excludes interbank deposits 





Philippines  1963  US$2,375 (approx 3 x GNI per capita); 
excludes interbank deposits 
0.2 percent of average 




Tanzania  1994  US$376 (approx 2 x GNI per capita); 
excludes interbank deposits 





Uganda  1994  US$2,310 (approx 8 x GNI per capita); 
excludes interbank deposits 
0.2 percent of average 





GNI Gross national income. 
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2001). 
RELATED NONFINANCIAL REGULATORY ISSUES 
68.  Various components of the regulatory framework are closely interrelated and may be interdependent. For 
instance, the existence of a special law on microfinance or of a more general law on banking and finance 
that recognizes microfinance as a legitimate activity when carried out by authorized institutions is not a 
sufficient condition for the development of institutions providing microfinance services. On the part of 
MFIs, substantial investment may be required to bring their systems up to the standard required for formal 
reporting requirements. On the part of supervisory authorities, they may have to adapt regulations 
governing interest rates, collateral, and portfolio quality to the methodologies of microfinance for 
commercial financial institutions to become actively involved in microfinance.  
69.  Judicial procedures on ownership, security interest, and collateral issues.  Much remains to be 
done in the three countries on reforming laws and judicial processes in relation to property rights, 
collateral law, and security interest, not only for microfinance transactions, but also for the financial sector 
as a whole. Tanzania has taken significant steps to modernize and improve its legal system and judicial 
processes for resolving commercial disputes, as illustrated in box 2. Tanzania’s approach to unclogging 
the heavy load of cases brought before the High Court is an  innovative approach that can provide 
illustrative lessons for other countries in the region and elsewhere. 
70.  Tax and fiscal policy issues.  Tax laws on admissible expenses, for instance, provisioning for possible 
loan losses, need to be synchronized with the requirements for prudentially acceptable operational 
procedures of financial institutions. The Bank of Tanzania’s requirements and procedures for asset 
                                                 
15   Deposit insurance coverage in the countries cited is clearly narrow in scope (it excludes interbank deposits) and low in 
coverage limits per account. In the case of the Philippines and Tanzania, membership in the deposit insurance system  
is compulsory for banks and institutions that are authorized and licensed to accept deposits, and their premiums are 
assessed and collected quarterly. Financial institutions that are neither regulated nor supervised by the central 
banking/supervisory authority, for example, NGO MFIs and CFIs, or that may be registered with the banking authority 
and may be authorized to mobilize wholesale institutional deposit funds through large-value certificates of time deposit 
or money market instruments but are not authorized to accept retail deposits from the public, are not part of the formal 
deposit insurance system. The financial cooperative sectors in the countries studied count on a significantly large base 
of members, whose savings deposits in their respective CFIs may therefore be at risk of loss because of a variety of 
factors, including fraud.  22 
classification and provisioning for delinquent loans follow international standards; however, the current 
tax regime does not permit banks to record provisions for possible loan losses as allowable expenses in 
their statement of income and expenses for tax purposes, thereby discouraging compliance.  
71.  Labor laws and regulations.  Labor laws on institutional employment continue to present obstacles for 
financial institutions in general, including MFIs, in their attempts to become more efficient. For instance, 
in Tanzania firing employees, even for just cause such as fraud, is virtually impossible. Such laws are 
clearly a substantial deterrent to progressive employment and personnel development programs and 
practices and need to be reviewed and reformed. 
Box 2. Facilitating Dispute Resolution through the Commercial Court, Tanzania 
 
Tanzania recently established a separate Commercial Court to ensure the efficient processing and timely 
resolution of commercial disputes. By avoiding procedural bottlenecks, the court can settle disputes expeditiously 
and efficiently for the benefit of all parties involved. There is no fixed definition of a commercial case. Broadly, it 
covers the liabilities of a business person, commercial organization, or individual arising out of commercial or 
business activities. It also involves the structuring or payment of commercial debt by or to a business person, 
commercial organization, or individual. The value of cases handled by the court ranges from T Sh 10 million to T 
Sh 300 million (US$12,500 to US$37,500).  
The court’s mandate includes streamlining procedures to facilitate the quick resolution of commercial disputes. 
Alternative dispute resolution remains available to the Commercial Court, which promotes mediation and other 
forms of settlement to avoid trials. The government introduced these options because of congestion and 
excessive delays in the disposal of court cases.  
The 43 staff members of the Commercial Court include three judges, one registrar, and a number of deputy 
registrars. While it enjoys a degree of autonomy in financing and staffing, the court is constitutionally an integral 
part of the High Court of Tanzania and its staff members are employees of the judicial system. Both parties to a 
case are required to pay court fees when documents are filed. The fee, currently set at 3 percent of the claim 
amount, is significantly higher than that payable in the High Court.  
Bankers and members of the business community have expressed appreciation of the Commercial Court and are 
satisfied with its performance, as most cases were resolved within three months. In 2000 the court resolved 104 
cases. In 2001, 185 cases were filed and the court had already decided 110 cases during the first seven months 
of the year. 
Source: World Bank 2001.  
 
IV. MAIN FINDINGS 
72.  The worldwide success that MFIs and microfinance programs have achieved in making financial services 
accessible to the poor and microenterprises has spawned initiatives to expand them.  The regulatory policy 
responses of governments have ranged from deliberate efforts to promote microfinance development by 
establishing special regulatory niches to control of heretofore unregulated MFI activities. An intermediate 
approach has been to integrate commercial microfinance into the formal financial sector by adjusting 
existing regulatory structures to accommodate and legitimize the provision of microfinance services by 
various types of institutions. 
73.  A central issue is whether licensing promotes or discourages the integration of microfinance 
methodologies into the financial system. Regulations that prevent specialized, commercially-oriented 
MFIs from entering the market or commercial banks from going down-market can be considered unduly 
restrictive. Regulations that permit the licensing of sufficiently qualified MFIs and are adapted to the 
nature of microfinance portfolios can facilitate financial system development that reaches poorer clients. 
Regulations and government credit programs that prevent MFIs from evolving as self-sustainable 
financial institutions tend to marginalize microfinance. Based on the countries studied and on other 
experiences, the financial sector regulatory framework generally compartmentalizes MFIs into several 
categories, accommodating some forms as licensed financial institutions (with varying degrees of 
restriction on entry), while allowing others to operate outside the formal regulatory framework. In a few 
cases the responsibility for regulation is shifted to agencies other than a central banking authority.  23 
OPENING THE FORMAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE GROWTH OF MICROFINANCE  
74.  The approaches to microfinance regulation in the countries studied could be characterized as strategic 
policy choices to develop sustainable microfinance.  In Benin and other UMOA countries, the law sought 
to only promote credit unions despite the existence of a large  number of microfinance NGOs, which 
continue to provide microfinance services by virtue of the legalized accommodations in an otherwise 
highly restrictive legal and regulatory framework. However, the convention-cadre or simple permit 
process which allows non–credit union MFIs to operate may not serve as a suitable basis for further rapid 
expansion of organized, sustainable microfinance. The convention-cadre with the Ministry of Finance 
does not provide clear and standard conditions or a basis on which non–credit union entities can engage in 
the business of providing microfinance services.  In Ghana the authorities created new regulatory 
categories for licensed institutions to permit the entry of new types of financial intermediaries — RCBs 
under the existing law and S&Ls and other MFIs under the new NBFI Law — even though this was not 
motivated by a microfinance strategy as such. In Tanzania the existing banking laws and regulatory 
framework permitted the entry of licensed banking institutions serving specialized and limited market 
niches, but this did not result in a large-scale emergence of MFIs using these regulatory categories. The 
new Law on Microfinance establishes a framework for institutions specializing in microfinance, that is, 
licensed microfinance companies and CFIs, although a risk exists that the regulations may make 
Tanzania’s overall framework for microfinance more restrictive.  
75.  The perspectives that have been extracted from the experiences of Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania can be 
enriched by reviewing the experiences of other countries. South Africa’s approach to consumer credit 
microlending through exemption from interest rate ceilings under the Usury Act affords little access to 
external funds for authorized providers of microloans that are not licensed banks or CFIs that are exempt 
from the Banking Act. As a result the financial sector is segmented and compartmentalized, and 
establishing a legal mechanism to circumvent the Usury Law is a major incentive in the complex 
regulatory framework for microfinance.  Uganda’s microfinance industry includes a commercial bank, a 
licensed “Tier 2” nonbank microfinance institution, about 90 national and international NGOs operating 
specialized MFIs, at least 700 smaller multisectoral NGOs and community-based organizations engaged 
in microfinance, and several hundred cooperatives and member-based savings and credit organizations, as 
well as informal savings and credit groups and moneylenders. A number of donor and government 
programs are also active in the sector, including programs for capacity building, for advising the Bank of 
Uganda, and for wholesaling funds to small MFIs.  
76.  The push in Uganda in the late 1990s for a special regulatory niche for microfinance institutions came in 
part from the leading NGO MFIs, of which at least four specialized only in microfinance, and which 
wanted to be able to take savings deposits legally as a basis for expansion. At the same time the Bank of 
Uganda became increasingly concerned about the risks to poor people’s savings in MFIs and village banks 
that were being promoted under donor programs, especially in the light of commercial bank failures. 
Despite potential conflicts between the objectives of the practitioners and of the Central Bank’s regulators, 
a consultative process over about four years yielded the 2003 Microfinance Deposit-taking Institutions 
Act, which establishes a new “Tier 3” for MFIs that wish to take and intermediate deposits from the public 
to become licensed with a substantially lower minimum capital requirement (US$0.4 million) than for 
commercial banks (US$2.3 million). Other MFIs, including credit NGOs and small, member-based 
savings and credit associations, are left outside the Bank of Uganda’s supervisory responsibilities, 
although Parliament required that legislation for regulation of “Tier IV” MFIs be prepared as a condition 
of passing the MDI Act.  
77.  Ethiopia’s 1996 Law on Licensing and Supervision of Micro-Financing Institutions shifted the basis of 
microfinance from humanitarian-oriented projects to commercially-oriented financial intermediation. As a 
result Ethiopia now has 21 licensed MFIs, with strong rural penetration and high operational efficiency, 
some of which have reached a significant scale (two have more than 200,000 clients). Nevertheless, the 
system has some weaknesses in terms of restrictiveness, supervision capacity, compliance with regulatory 
norms, governance, and lack of flexibility.  Only wholly Ethiopian-owned corporations can be licensed, 
prohibiting NGOs from engaging in microfinance even with their own funds. The only other legal form of  24 
microfinance is savings and credit cooperatives, which the Central Bank does not regulate. Supervision 
capacity has lagged far behind, and MFIs have not complied with audit requirements. MFIs are generally 
sponsored indirectly either by regional governments or NGOs, and a disconnect is often apparent between 
board members and sources of capital. The law restricts MFIs to group lending methodology and to loans 
below about US$600. Even though many of Ethiopia’s MFIs have reached high levels of operational 
efficiency, these restrictions along with pressures to keep interest rates low hinder their achievement of 
financial self-sufficiency.  
78.  Peru’s experience provides some useful lessons on the benefits of a regulatory framework that facilitates 
integration of commercial MFIs into the financial system, in contrast to compartmentalizing microfinance 
from the overall financial system. Amendments to the Banking Law in 1995 allowed for the establishment 
of entidades de desarrollo para la pequeña y micro empresa (development finance institutions for small 
and micro-enterprises or EDPYMEs) with minimum capitalization of about US$265,000, as well as a 
simplified system for loan analysis, classification, and provisioning. The implementing regulations issued 
by the Superintendency for Banks and Insurance Companies stipulate a capital base of US$1 million and 
the attainment and maintenance of prescribed risk ratings for two years before the superintendency can 
authorize an EDPYME to accept savings deposits (Jannson and Wenner 1997). EDPYMEs can access 
commercial bank credit, equity markets, and special rediscount facilities from the Peruvian Development 
Bank. To access capital markets, EDPYMEs must register with the Securities Commission and submit 
year-end audited accounts. The EDPYME legal structure allows for a period of transition to fully 
regulated status.  
SEQUENCING POLICY REFORMS AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION  
79.  A core aspect of the sequencing of policy reforms is whether or not introducing a regulatory framework 
that specifically addresses microfinance is an effective way to attract the entry of good, knowledgeable 
institutional providers of microfinance services where few or none may have existed. Do the three 
countries’ experiences in the evolution and development of their respective microfinance sectors support 
this proposition? If the answer is no, or if the available data are inconclusive, then identifying other 
significant factors or influences would be useful. For instance, Uganda’s experience shows that a variety 
of viable and sustainable MFIs can emerge and develop without a microfinance-specific regulatory 
framework in place, and that legislation to amend the regulatory framework can take place once it 
becomes essential to accommodate commercially-oriented microfinance.  
80.  Benin.  The emergence of credit unions and of NGO and other non–credit union MFIs in Benin preceded 
the establishment of microfinance-specific legislation and regulatory frameworks, which then laid the 
ground rules for them to become legitimate financial intermediaries. However, the lack of clarity 
regarding the status of entities other than credit unions permitted through the convention cadre has created 
uncertainty as to whether they will eventually be permanently accommodated within the PARMEC Law. 
81.  Ghana  used the existing Banking Law and the new NBFI Law to open up new forms of licensed financial 
intermediaries that could provide rural and microfinancial services. Nevertheless, a microfinance-specific 
regulatory framework did not exist until changes in the business rules for NBFIs addressed the issues of 
specific intermediation and financing activities by different categories of institutions. The S&L category 
in the overall financial regulation framework permitted the entry o f private investment to serve a 
particular market niche on a smaller scale than that required for commercial banks and the transformation 
of NGOs. While Ghana succeeded in applying commercial principles to microfinance and innovating in 
relation to the financial linkages between commercial and informal entities, the number and weakness of 
the resulting institutions overwhelmed the supervisory authorities’ limited capacity to apply the regulatory 
guidelines. These difficulties led to a subsequent increase in restrictiveness via a higher minimum 
capitalization requirement to restrain new entry. Thus one lesson is that if countries reform their 
regulations to make them more accommodating, they must strengthen their supervisory capacity 
commensurate with the likely extent of entry.  25 
82.  Tanzania’s  financial sector regulatory framework includes licensing categories for limited-service 
regional and community banks, but the low capitalization levels for entry do not appear to have 
encouraged the larger and more successful NGO MFIs to seek out these licensed categories as 
opportunities for transformation. With the recent establishment of a microfinance-specific legal and 
regulatory framework, Tanzania will provide a good case study of whether or not installing such a 
framework is an effective way to attract the entry of desirable international investors into the microfinance 
industry.  
IMPACT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT 
83.  Benin generally treats microfinance as separate from the banking and financial system, yet requires formal 
status for all entities whether they mobilize savings or not. This has not proven effective in integrating 
microfinance into the commercial financial system or in rendering effective supervision where it is most 
needed. The BCEAO Law governs the business operations of commercial banks and NBFIs, which are 
supervised by the Regional Banking Commission, with no accommodation made for them to engage in 
microfinance activities. The PARMEC Law, which enables entities other than licensed commercial banks 
and NBFIs to provide microfinance services, recognizes only the credit union organizational format for 
entities authorized and licensed to provide savings and credit services to microfinance clients, but 
supervision rests with the Ministry of Finance, which lacks the capacity and skills to do so effectively. 
While non–credit union entities may legitimately provide savings and credit services through an interim, 
time-bound authorization from the Ministry of Finance, clarity is lacking about their long-term status and 
the ministry’s discretionary powers. This situation is not conducive to serious efforts to build up the MFIs’ 
outreach and their financial and institutional capacity or to improve the technical supervision capacity of 
the ministry’s Microfinance Unit (Ouattara 2003).  
84.  Ghana’s experience underscores the importance of developing an inclusive regulatory framework that 
accommodates different formats of formal (as well as informal) rural and microfinance institutions, 
including moving to make CFIs part of the prudentially regulated financial sector. Perhaps in part because 
of this variety of legal formats, NGOs have failed to emerge as a significant organizational format for 
microfinance providers, although they have pioneered new methodologies in collaboration with other 
financial institutions. Financially viable microfinance NGOs now face a relatively high barrier to 
transformation because of the recent substantial increases in the minimum capitalization requirement for 
becoming a licensed NBFI under the S&L category, which was perhaps intended to restrict the burden on 
Ghana’s limited supervision capacity. 
85.  Tanzania’s recently passed legal and regulatory framework is being re-oriented to achieve a sought-after 
commercialization of microfinance and the development of institutional providers of microfinance 
services into sustainable, licensed MFIs, depending on the implementation regulations. Even as the 
minimum capitalization requirement for commercial banks has been raised from US$1.00  million to 
US$5.0 million, the banking authorities are considering a much lower minimum capitalization 
requirement for licensed microfinance companies or CFIs, at between US$500,000 to US$800,000.  Even 
though this is less than the new minimum capitalization requirement for S&Ls in Ghana, the regulations 
for implementing the new law introduce complex and stringent financial accounting and reporting 
requirements that may be beyond the technical capacity and resource endowments of Tanzanian 
microfinance NGOs and CFIs. Thus, while the structure of the regulatory framework is accommodating 
on the surface, whether it strikes the right balance between facilitating and restricting new entry remains 
to be seen. 
REGULATING ACTIVITIES OR INSTITUTIONS  
86.  In creating an overall regulatory framework for the financial sector that also accommodates the provision 
of financial services to the economically active poor and to low-income households, the objectives of new 
or additional regulation must be clear. What exactly will a supervisory authority regulate? The two 
possible objects of regulation are the financial intermediation activity or the institution carrying out the  26 
activity, although these are not mutually exclusive choices. Regulations will identify and define the 
specific financial activities covered, but the same regulations will generally also focus on and differentiate 
among the institutions engaged in the regulated activities. 
87.  Thus regulations must include a readily understood, unambiguous, legal definition of microfinance 
services. Among other considerations, having such a definition of the microfinance product and the 
microfinancing activity helps to forestall and minimize the use of regulatory arbitrage by investors whose 
interests may lie in securing entry for their financial institutions as licensed entities with the least possible 
amount of investment, but without becoming substantively involved in microfinance. 
88.  The Bank of Ghana’s rules and regulations for NBFIs and Tanzania’s new Law on Microfinance provide 
clear definitions of microfinancial services and products. Other useful examples include Uganda’s new 
Microfinance Law; the Philippine Central Bank’s recent circulars on microfinance loans and on 
institutions engaged in microfinance; Peru’s regulations establishing the category of EDPYMEs for 
micro-enterprise and finance for small and medium enterprises; and Bolivia’s banking regulation 
amendments creating the private financial fund status for micro, small, and medium enterprise finance.  
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
89.  The objective of prudential supervision is to ensure the financial soundness of institutions that have been 
authorized to carry out financial activities subject to certain restrictions. The licensing authority 
effectively vouches for the soundness of licensed financial institutions and the safety of public funds that 
they accept and intermediate. Prudential supervision includes off-site monitoring, on-site examination of 
documents, internal and external reports, and other actions to verify compliance with prudential standards 
and guidelines. The authority to supervise includes the power to impose sanctions for noncompliance and, 
at the extreme, to take over, close, and liquidate institutions in case of flagrant uncorrected violations. 
90.  Regulatory oversight is concerned with ensuring that business operations are conducted in accordance with 
accepted standards of fair business practices. Such oversight is sometimes called nonprudential regulation, 
because of the regulatory body’s significantly diminished control over regulated financial institutions’ 
operations and activities. Oversight is generally carried out through periodic submission and monitoring 
of operating and financial reports, including externally audited annual financial statements.  
91.  While licensed banks are subject to prudential supervision as deposit-taking institutions, finance 
companies that do not take deposits may be subject only to regulatory oversight, although the general 
public may not be fully aware of the distinction. The central banking authority does not vouch for the 
soundness of the latter type of financial institution, thus investors in the commercial paper or securities 
issues of regulated finance companies are at full risk in the event of business failure by such an institution. 
In the three countries studied, as well as in other countries, CFIs that are not under the jurisdiction of and 
subject to licensing by the central banking authority are not part of the prudential supervision structure. 
Neither are nonbank NGO MFIs, even though they may be required to go through a registration process 
with a regulatory authority or agency. The exception is Benin, where credit unions, non–credit union 
MFIs, and NBFIs are subject to licensing in one form or another. 
INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY CONSIDERATIONS 
92.  Capacity building considerations fall into three main areas: (a) the technical capacity of directors, 
managers, and staff of MFIs, especially of CFIs; (b) the technical capacity of staff in regulatory agencies 
to carry out the required regulatory oversight and, when necessary, prudential supervision of regulated and 
licensed MFIs; and (c) the financial and technical resources for creating new regulatory and supervisory 
policies, processes, and agencies appropriate for microfinance.  An unbalanced approach results in 
inadequate attention to supervisory capacity and costs in the design of the regulatory framework.  The 
experience of MFIs in other countries demonstrates that mobilizing savings and managing them safely and 
profitably entails a more complex set of skills, systems and resources than accessing and intermediating 
wholesale commercial funds.  Using the regulatory framework to push microfinance development is likely  27 
to result in overlooking other less costly and less technically demanding approaches to commercializing 
microfinance, e.g., regulations that enable MFIs to access commercial funds from licensed banks and forge 
strategic alliances with the formal financial sector. 
93.  The benefits from regulating microfinance may be limited when commercial banking standards are applied 
to MFIs without adequate consideration of microfinance methodologies.  For supervision to be effective, 
the data requirements and the indicators used must be adapted to the operations of MFIs, and they in turn 
must adapt their information systems to central bank reporting requirements. Given the short-term nature 
of MFI loan portfolios, more rigorous standards in certain areas, such as portfolio quality and 
provisioning, together with more frequent monitoring, may be warranted.  This raises a further issue that 
has received scant attention:  measuring and paying for the costs of supervision.  The costs of supervising 
MFIs are likely to be greater than those for commercial banks, especially when the more numerous and 
small MFIs outnumber the banks.  Moreover, supervision fees are usually set as a percentage of the value 
of assets examined, and MFIs’ asset bases are much smaller than those of banks. 
LOCATING THE AUTHORITY FOR REGULATION 
94.  The different approaches to prudential regulation of MFIs tried in a number of countries fall into three 
main categories: (a) regulation and supervision by the banking authority; (b) regulation and supervision by 
a specialized agency s eparate from the banking authority as an auxiliary or under a delegation 
arrangement; and (c) regulation and supervision through a self-regulatory body, usually the umbrella 
organization for specific categories of MFIs. Insofar as Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania are concerned, 
approaches toward prudential regulation of institutions involved in microfinance activities consist of 
regulation and supervision by the banking authority in combination with one or more of the other 
approaches. 
95.  An important issue is the e xtent to which regulatory authority should be centralized, delegated, or 
decentralized. Like many other countries in Africa, the microfinance regulatory frameworks of Benin, 
Ghana and Tanzania have come into being under circumstances of fragmented authority. A central bank 
authority is responsible for prudential supervision of licensed banks and financial institutions, a 
cooperatives authority is responsible for member-based SACCOs (usually focused on registration and 
cooperative principles rather than financial performance), and NGO MFIs are registered with non-
financial government agencies.  In deciding how best to implement regulatory responsibilities, two 
distinctions are important:  regulatory policy should have a single locus, while application of regulatory 
functions can be delegated to different regulatory units with specialized responsibilities; and the criteria 
and authorities for prudential supervision should differ from those for non-prudential regulatory oversight.  
•  The  BCEAO and the Regional Banking Commission have jurisdiction over the regulation and 
supervision of commercial banks and NBFIs in Benin. Under the PARMEC Law, the Ministry of 
Finance is responsible for regulating and supervising credit unions and non–credit union MFIs.  
However, the delegation of supervisory functions by the regional central bank of UMOA to Ministries 
of Finance has proven ineffective in the prudential supervision of microfinance activities and 
institutions.   
•  The Bank of Ghana has jurisdiction over banks and NBFIs, and the draft Credit Union Law envisages 
supervision over CFIs by a new Credit Union Supervisory Board, separate from both the Bank of 
Ghana and the Department of Cooperatives. Currently the CUA and the Department of Cooperatives 
jointly exercise quasi supervision through annual examinations and audits. NGO MFIs are outside the 
Bank of Ghana’s jurisdiction. Insofar as RCBs are concerned, the plan is to delegate supervision to the 
Rural Bank Apex Bank  (specially licensed as a second-tier financial institution serving the RCBs). 
•  The Bank of Tanzania has jurisdiction over banks, NBFIs, and the new category of licensed 
microfinance companies and CFIs provided for by the new Law on Microfinance. The Ministry of 
Cooperatives and Marketing regulates SACCOs, although it appears to share this function somewhat 
with local governments under the provisions of the Decentralization Law, and the Savings and Credit  28 
Cooperative Union League of Tanzania, an upper-tier federation of CFIs, provides some self-
regulatory oversight. 
INTEGRATING COOPERATIVE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS INTO THE MICROFINANCE SECTOR 
96.  Financial cooperatives offer important potential for decentralizing access to financial services, particularly 
in rural areas that banks and commercial MFIs may find too costly to reach.  But it has proven difficult 
both to promote their growth as sustainable financial intermediaries and to integrate them into formal 
financial regulatory systems.  In the three countries CFIs constitute an important and comparatively large 
segment of the microfinance industry in terms of the number of institutions and their membership base. 
Governments of most countries, as well as the donor community, need to focus more attention on 
measures to make the microfinance industry an integral part of the overall financial sector, including the 
CFI segment, which is still generally being treated as part of the cooperative sector rather than of the 
financial system. CFIs require special attention during the structuring of specialized microfinance 
regulatory frameworks. Technical capacity building is important not only for paid staff, but also for CFI 
directors and committee members, who often consist of member volunteers. 
97.  While Benin’s microfinance law prioritizes financial cooperatives, the supervisory burden has proven 
overwhelming, aggravated by responsibilities for also supervising non-deposit-taking MFIs. Financial 
policy-makers in Ghana and Tanzania have begun to recognize the need to incorporate financial 
cooperatives into the regulatory framework, although they are effectively excluded in the practical 
application of financial regulations.  Ghana’s proposed approach of recognizing dual responsibilities of 
central bank and cooperatives authorities for CUs, with some delegation of front-line supervision to the 
apex body, appears promising and bears watching.  Related to institutional strengthening and the build up 
of technical capacity, Tanzania needs to make the regulatory oversight or prudential regulation structure 
over CFIs consistent with the intent of the national microfinance policy and a proposed microfinance law. 
The regulatory jurisdiction is overlapping, and gaps generated by the Decentralization Law need to be 
closed. 
V. KEY LESSONS LEARNED  
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMATS FOR MICROFINANCE 
98.  The experience of many countries suggests that implementing a policy to harness microfinance 
methodologies to help reduce poverty by providing low-income households and microenterprises 
with greater access to financial services depends on having in place a diverse range of MFIs 
targeting different niches, and that introducing different approaches and products is important. The 
result can be facilitated by a flexible policy approach that opens the formal regulatory framework to the 
forms that microfinance can take, especially in the early stages of development (as in Ghana and 
Tanzania). A country that has a financial sector regulatory framework that unduly restricts or prescribes 
the provision of microfinancial services—whether through usury law ceilings on interest rates, outright 
prohibition on financial services by unlicensed entities (as in Benin, Ethiopia, and South Africa), or steep 
barriers to obtaining licensed status—is less likely to develop an effective microfinance industry that is 
well integrated with the financial system. Although restrictive policies that essentially marginalize 
microfinance outside the regulated financial system will not necessarily prevent the emergence of 
nonfinancial and semiformal microfinance entities providing financial services, they may create 
uncertainty regarding the status of MFIs and retard their evolution into providers of commercial services.  
TIERED STRUCTURES AND FINANCIAL DEEPENING 
99.  The explicit recognition of different tiers of institutions in the financial structure, both regulated and 
unregulated, facilitates financial deepening and outreach to otherwise underserved groups, 
especially rural areas and the poor.  A tiered financial systems approach recognizes the important roles  29 
of both regulated and unregulated institutions in the microfinance system, including grassroots savings 
and credit groups, microfinance NGOs, universal commercial banks, finance companies, cooperative 
banks, other specialized and regulated MFIs, insurance companies, and wholesale financing institutions. 
Worldwide, the outreach of microfinance tends to be greatest where the legal and regulatory system 
incorporates financially sustainable microfinance through licensed financial intermediaries, including 
specialized MFIs that can mobilize commercial sources of funds, without excluding credit-only MFIs 
using other people’s money or small member-based CFIs. Nevertheless, policies, regulations, and legal 
structures need to balance promotion of the microfinance industry with, first, the obligation to protect 
savers and investors, and second, the costs of supervision to both the regulatory authorities and the 
licensed MFIs.  
100.  A licensed tier with appropriate regulations that is accessible to high-performing MFIs can 
encourage capacity building and innovation aimed at reaching both self-sufficiency and outreach. 
However, integrating microfinance into the financial sector does not mean that all microfinance 
institutions ought to be regulated, but rather is intended to encourage strong regulated and unregulated 
institutions of all types to provide services on a sustainable basis under shared performance standards and 
to encourage the regulatory authorities to develop appropriate prudential regulations and staff capacity. 
One or more tiers of deposit-taking institutions could be encouraged to emerge by setting lower minimum 
capitalization requirements while (a) limiting activities under the institutional charter (for example, to 
micro-enterprise and small and medium business lending and to non-demand deposits); (b) placing caps on 
loan sizes or overall assets; and/or (c) tightening prudential standards in such areas as capital adequacy 
ratios, risk weighting of assets, liquidity, and loan loss provisioning. 
•  This approach can open a window for alternative specialized institutions that benefit from different 
cost and regulatory structures.  The developing countries outside Africa whose financial sectors are 
characterized by tiering include Indonesia and the Philippines in Asia and Bolivia and Peru in Latin 
America, where the financial system regulatory framework permits a wide range of institutional 
providers of microfinance services in a multitiered structure, and the microfinance sector generally 
appears to be much larger, to consist of more diverse institutions, and to have better prospects for self-
sustainability.  
•  Ghana has a wide range of MFIs, both explicitly licensed (rural banks, S&Ls, credit unions) and 
tolerated ( susu collectors, NGOs, and self-help groups), but it has not achieved great success in 
reaching scale and self-sustainability. Benin’s restrictive approach, which focuses on microfinance via 
credit unions as the only legally authorized format, appears to be giving way to tacit acceptance of a 
more tiered structure. South Africa’s regulatory adjustments to allow and regulate microlending as an 
exemption from the Usury Law have resulted in explosive growth, not only in the volume of 
microcredit loans, but also in the variety of institutions seeking the exemption and engaging in the 
business of providing consumer microcredit. A possible lesson may be that under certain favorable 
conditions, including a strong formal commercial financial sector and the existence of enforceable 
security (in this case, via wage employment), regulating a profitable product can facilitate rapid 
commercialization. 
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT 
101.  The experience in the three countries does not support the proposition that establishing new 
regulatory categories will necessarily promote commercialization of microfinance or the creation of 
financially sustainable MFIs where few or none exist.  Experiences in other countries such as Uganda 
and Kenya show that a variety of viable and sustainable MFIs can emerge and develop without a 
microfinance-specific regulatory framework, while microfinance continues to flourish in Benin despite a 
restrictive legal and regulatory framework.  When there is a critical mass of viable microfinance providers, 
new legislation to amend the regulatory framework is likely to be more productive  in facilitating the 
transformation of high-performing non-bank MFIs to licensed status in a specially adapted niche – which 
is the approach that Uganda and Kenya are now taking.  In Tanzania, the rationale for the new Law on  30 
Microfinance Companies is to attract international microfinance institutions and investors into Tanzania’s 
microfinance market, although it is premature to draw conclusions about its success. By enabling 
successful NGO MFIs to evolve to the next stage, Uganda’s new law appears to be triggering an inflow of 
investment and capacity-building assistance to help existing large MFIs to make the transformation, and 
urban competition is already driving some to seek more rural outlets in anticipation of becoming licensed 
to take savings.  While G hana’s NBFI Law and low minimum capitalization requirement for S&Ls 
facilitated entry and transformation, the rate of entry and weak performance exceeded the capacity of 
supervisory authorities. 
102.  The capacities of authorities to implement their regulatory obligations and of MFIs to comply are a 
critical constraint on the effectiveness of new legislation in promoting and regulating microfinance. 
Setting up new licensing categories for rural banks and savings and loan companies in Ghana did stimulate 
entry of new types of MFIs that helped broaden and deepen access to financial services. Nevertheless, 
neither the institutions nor the regulatory authorities had adequate technical capacity to ensure compliance 
with regulatory standards, leading subsequently to more demanding requirements as a barrier to new entry.  
New legislation in Benin and Tanzania brought existing non-bank MFIs under licensing and supervisory 
requirements, but the goal of forcing improvements in their financial performance is not likely to be 
realized, because the coverage of institutions greatly exceeds the capabilities of the designated supervisory 
authorities and the non-bank MFIs targeted for regulation are organizationally and financially weak.  
103.  The development of a new regulatory framework for microfinance should be accompanied by 
complementary modifications of other business laws and regulations.  This is true especially in the 
areas of taxation, contract enforcement, collateral registration and enforcement, securities regulations and 
consumer protection.  These laws and administrative rules also need to be adapted to microfinance 
methodologies, where loan transactions and the legal status of borrowers differ markedly from those in 
conventional commercial banking and finance. 
INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY FOR PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
104.  The creation of microfinance legal and regulatory structures should be accompanied by substantial 
up-front investment in raising the awareness of policymakers, consulting with stakeholders, 
improving systems and staff capabilities in MFIs to be regulated, and staffing up and training the 
supervisory authorities.  As the microfinance sector develops in response to demand from underserved 
segments, the overall regulatory framework for the financial sector is likely to be subjected to pressures for 
adjustments and changes, as is the case in all three countries studied.  Hasty passage of new laws or 
introduction of government programs without adequate consultation or awareness of good (and bad) 
practices risks p utting in place systems with a short-term focus that may undermine longer-term 
development objectives. Opening up formal licensing to MFIs too rapidly may overwhelm the capacity of 
the supervisory authorities.   
105.  An unbalanced approach results in inadequate attention to supervisory capacity and costs in the 
design of the regulatory framework.  The experience of MFIs in other countries demonstrates that 
mobilizing savings and managing them safely and profitably entails a more complex set of skills, systems 
and resources than accessing and intermediating wholesale commercial funds.  Using the regulatory 
framework to push microfinance development is likely to result in overlooking other less costly and less 
technically demanding approaches to commercializing microfinance, e.g., regulations that enable MFIs to 
access commercial funds from licensed banks and forge strategic alliances with the formal financial sector. 
106.  Regulators and supervisors should deliberately distinguish between licensed deposit-taking MFIs 
whose financial soundness they verify through prudential supervision versus categories of MFIs that 
may be registered, but for which the government bears no responsibility. The absence of a formal 
deposit protection system generates a fiscal exposure and risk for the government that makes publicizing 
this distinction especially important. In particular, regulators and supervisors should exclude nondeposit-
taking, credit-only MFIs from their prudential supervisory activities to conserve scarce supervisory 
resources and because the public’s savings are not at stake. In such cases donors, banks, and other funders  31 
can be expected to exercise adequate oversight. Small member-based savings and credit associations are 
normally excluded from direct prudential supervision by the regulatory authorities, although regulatory 
oversight by an independent body or industry association is desirable to gather data and report on 
performance in meeting established standards. Nonsupervised MFIs may even be required to periodically 
submit to a designated oversight agency certified reports and supporting schedules on financial results and 
business operations, according to a prescribed set of formats and standards, for example, a ceiling on 
permissible debt-equity ratios, liquidity of assets, portfolio quality, and provisioning guidelines. 
SEQUENCING OF POLICY IS STRATEGIC TO AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK 
107.  A national strategic planning process for microfinance policy can be useful in building consensus on 
the broad approach to developing microfinance as part of financial systems development, and 
perhaps occasionally in providing alternatives to politically motivated programs, but is neither 
necessary for development of the industry nor a guarantee against inconsistent approaches.  In 
Tanzania and Uganda, the process of preparing a strategy helped build consensus and establish 
government withdrawal from direct intervention as a policy.  A related issue is whether creating a 
specialized microfinance regulatory framework is effective in attracting the entry of good institutional 
providers of microfinance services. Permitting credit-only NGOs to operate legally is generally considered 
desirable to promote innovation and develop a microfinance industry serving relatively poor clients 
(although Benin’s l egal structure is somewhat restrictive with respect to NGO MFIs, and Ethiopia’s 
prohibition was aimed in part at establishing a more businesslike approach to microfinance in place of its 
more donor-dependent, welfare-oriented approach).  The conclusion is that the appropriate sequencing 
depends on each country’s circumstances, and that it is most effective when the regulatory framework 
permits nonlicensed MFIs to evolve, establishes new licensed niches as the market develops, adjusts 
regulations in light of experience, and is accompanied by commensurate capacity building for the 
supervisory authorities.  
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APPENDIX: DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF MFIS 
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Note: All categories except nonprofit associations would normally be required to have internal controls, external audits, records of 
meetings, and annual reports and would have specified regulatory standards and requirements for entry and exit as MFIs  
a. Many small NGOs are organized by like-minded individuals as unincorporated economic or social associations of individuals 
without seeking the approval of or registration with a government agency. 
Source: Gallardo and Randhawa (2003); Ouattara (2003); Steel and Andah (2003). 
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